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In 1989, so-called ‘actually existing socialism’ collapsed, and for the next few decades the West 
seemed to have won the ideological fight, regarding the way society, politics, and the economy 
were to be organised. In the discipline of peace studies this led to a hegemonic status of the 
liberal peace in terms of both theory and practice. Lately, however, the liberal peace has been 
faced with increased criticism. Liberal peacebuilding seems unable to respond to the needs and 
wishes of people affected by violent conflict. Its tactics are highly standardised, and aim at 
engineering a specific set of conditions supposed to ensure a sustainable peace. Most often, these 
tactics fail to institutionalise the promised peace. Moreover, they display neo-colonial 
tendencies, as the ability to define and institute peace is ascribed to those living in peace, while 
those immersed in conflict are expected to receive whatever action plan has been declared most 
suitable for them. This is highly problematic, as those living in peace also happen to benefit from 
living in the core of globally operating social, political, and economic power relations. The 
liberal peace has thus been increasingly recognised in its imperial character. What has not been 
thoroughly researched, however, is how this imperial character of the liberal peace might be 
connected to very basic epistemological assumptions Western philosophy, and with it Western 
academia, holds concerning the subject, rationality, understanding and truth.  
In this thesis I shall investigate exactly this connection and try to show, how deeply the 
concepts and practices of the liberal peace operate within a specifically Western understanding 
of what it means to be a human being, and how this human being comprehends and engages with 
the world. I will argue that it is, again, this understanding that leads us to a specific conception of 
what is needed in order to create a politically lasting peace. I shall first offer a thorough analysis 
of the discourse, condition and practice of liberal peace, as presented by its proponents, and 
contrast them with the downsides of liberal history, politics, and economics. Second, I shall 
introduce two philosophers critical of the Western tradition of epistemology: Emmanuel Lévinas 
and Jacques Derrida. Last, I shall juxtapose the approaches of Lévinas and Derrida to liberal 
peace, searching for both the criticism and the alternatives they might have to offer to a highly 
liberal approach to peace. 
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Hunger or destituteness (dénuement) are not formal structures to signify the radical 
and elusive alterity of the Other; they are not metaphors. The Other is a destitution 
and a hunger; he/she is concretely in danger of dying, and when I meet his/her 
‘proletarian nakedness’ I could kill him/her by my indifference. The Other is a dying 
Other or a dying part […]. Accordingly I am responsible for his/her life.  





The Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti writes that if you want to dispossess a 
people, the simplest way to do it is to tell their story and to start with ‘secondly’. 
Start the story with the arrows of the Native Americans, and not with the arrival of 
the British, and you have an entirely different story. Start the story with the failure 
of the African state, and not with the colonial creation of the African state, and you 
have an entirely different story. 
– Chimananda Ngozi Adichie2 
  
                                                
1 Herzog, 2002, p. 210 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Content – Liberalism and a Philosophy of Peace 
 
“Human affairs proceed in their intricate, endlessly varied, and unpredictable paths, but 
occasionally events occur that are taken to be sharp turning points in history.”3 One of these 
events that – as 1945 or 9/11 – wedged itself like a qualitative fissure into the timeline of our 
history is the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. With it, a previously bipolar world of contested 
political strategies was suddenly placed under the only guiding star left. This ideology was to 
lead, not only its followers, but all humanity towards ever greater progress, freedom and above 
all, peace.4 The collapse of so called ‘actually existing socialism’ bequeathed humanity with a 
single ideologically legitimate and practically plausible option for the structuring of social and 
political life. Time had come for an era of peace lead by the knowledge and experience of the 
Cold War’s victor, situated on the Western side of the former global division. Thus, the guiding 
star and the peace it was supposed to lead to were not so much about peace per se; rather, they 
were about promoting a specific political project. The peace to follow the anarchic balance-of-
power politics that had marked the second half of the 20th century had a name, and any hope for 
the future had to lie within it. The new era of peace was to be liberal.5  
Of course, the story is not that simple. Not only is the liberal peace far from 
homogeneous, but lately its practices have also received severe criticism. Unable to adequately 
respond to the needs of the population living in contexts of violent conflict, liberal peacebuilding 
has been, at best, called ‘virtual’, ‘a chimera’, and at worst, ‘imperial’ and ‘neo-colonial’.6 In 
short, the liberal peace was accused of becoming violent. Suggestions have been made to turn 
                                                
3 Chomsky, 2010, p. 3 
4 In this thesis I will discuss different interpretations of violence and peace that vary both in nature and specificity. 
The liberal peace operates with a narrow understanding of violence – mostly as direct – and relates peace to a 
specific set of principles, the implementation of which are thought enough to secure sustainable peace. (See: chapters 
2.1 and 4.2.1) Lévinas and Derrida, on the other hand, regard as violent any action that disrespects the singularity of 
a particular being. Violence, then, is already found in our basic form of judgement that places something particular 
under something more general in order to capture its essence. Both Lévinas and Derrida are therefore hesitant to 
define a specific condition that could ensure peace. To them, peace cannot be conceptualised or predetermined. It is a 
process into the unknown that should be lead by a deep concern for the singularity of the Other. (See: chapters 3 and 
4) 
5 See: Behnke, 2008, p. 21; Bush, in: Rhodes, 2003, p.137; Chandler, 2004, p. 59; Cooper, 2007, p. 613; Paris, 2002, 
pp. 637-638; Richmond, 2007, pp. 207-208 & 223 
6 See for example: Richmond, 2007, pp. 204-205; Richmond, 2009, p. 567 
2 
 
away from the mechanic and highly standardised institutionalisation of universal, liberal agendas, 
in order to give room to the particular, the indigenous, the local.7 Yet, it remains unclear, how 
this new turn in peace and conflict studies can evade the problems of domination, which cling to 
the still hegemonic discourse and practice of the liberal peace. As Andreas T. Hirblinger and 
Claudia Simens suggest, the renewed concern for the local still fails to fully recognise the 
humanity of people affected by violent conflict. Scholars, they write, “talk about ‘locals’ not as 
humans, but in terms of abstract categories”8, which are then used to identify who could 
potentially assist and who will undermine the peacebuilding process. Scholars and practitioners 
critical of the liberal project thus continue to engage in the production of identities that 
homogenise and essentialise an actually plural and internally varied group of human beings.9  
The problem with this identification is threefold. First, the production of identities is 
reserved to very few. Second, the identities constructed are not mere categories of thought, used 
to better understand the complexities of war and conflict. Peacebuilding physically intervenes 
into lives, whereby the being lost, or saved of a life is often influenced by or dependent on the 
identity given. Last, peace missions operate along a geographical division, which links the 
production of identities, the knowledge of peace and the ordering of an intervention to political 
and economic power. Violence – most often understood as direct physical assault – is specifically 
defined to match the problems of the global South. Accordingly, interventions rarely take place in 
the global North – that is, the West. It is needless to point to the historical continuity of this 
division, and a much older and much less camouflaged practice of intervention: colonialism. In 
sum, it almost seems as if recent criticism to the liberal peace is not critical enough.10 
Where does this inability to receive another human being for what he or she is spring 
from? Why the need to categorise, to superimpose identities, and, with it, to dominate, and 
ultimately exploit? In the following thesis, I would like to argue that these are not mere questions 
of politics, economy, or the law. They are posed to the human condition in its entirety. Peace, 
before all else, is a question of philosophy. To approach peace, we need to know how we relate to 
the world, to each other and to ourselves. That is, we must reflect and constantly reconsider our 
assumptions with regards to ontology and epistemology, always shaped by their own time and 
place. The Enlightenment, for example, – the philosophical root of the liberal peace – defends the 
                                                
7 See for example: Mac Ginty, 2008, pp. 143-154; Richmond, 2009, p. 566 
8 Hirblinger/Simons, 2014, p. 2 
9 See: Hirblinger/Simons, 2014, pp. 2-7 
10 See: Appeltshauser, 2014, p. 9-21; Polat, 2010, p. 317 
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values of freedom, reason, and the autonomous, rational subject. Yet, it equally harbours thoughts 
of racism, and is used to defend colonialism as a mission to civilise others. Above all, however, it 
is a particular, European project. The liberal peace, by building upon the Enlightenment’s 
foundations, might therefore never escape the violence of its Eurocentric roots.11 It is therefore 
necessary for peace scholars and practitioners to understand the liberal project in its particularity, 
and to engage in discussions that present different approaches to knowledge, subjectivity, the 
social, and, with it, the possibility of peace; approaches that are perhaps more fit to our times.  
Consequently, I12 shall test the following assumptions: Peace research and peacebuilding 
will continue to fail in their attempts to build sustainable peace if they remain restricted to the 
Enlightenment-shaped Western tradition of thought and its doxai concerning the rational subject, 
the power of reason, and the nature of freedom. Therefore, peace will not be found by constantly 
revising political and institutional suggestions as to how a peaceful society can be built and 
maintained. Instead, peace research needs to engage in a much more fundamental discussion with 
regards to the conception of knowledge and truth, the nature of subjectivity, and the latters 
engagement with and in the world. Peace research needs to let philosophy back in. Only thus 
might an answer to the violent and imperial character of the liberal peace be found.13  
 
1.2  Methodological Considerations 
 
This thesis will thus operate between disciplinary borders. On the one side, its inquiry is to be 
situated in the discipline of peace and conflict studies, since understanding the causes of violence 
and inquiring into the possibilities for peace are its major concern.14 The form this thesis takes, 
on the other hand, is that of a philosophical analysis. At its heart lies a close reading of and 
engagement with primary literature by Emmanuel Lévinas and Jacques Derrida. In a discipline 
mainly influenced by the social sciences and empirical research, this is just as unusual as it is 
                                                
11 See: Harpham, 1994, pp. 532-539 
12 I write in the frist person, singular for two reasons. First, as shall be more extensively discussed in chapter 4.2.1, I 
agree with Appeltshauser that research is highly political, rather than neutral. I therefore think it important not to 
make the author disappear in the texts that he or she writes and with it hide that every author writes from a specific 
point of view. Second and in consequence, as I will show in chapter 3.1, Lévinas argues that we can never take 
another position than our own. This, I think, should be made equally clear, by renouncing the use of a more ‘neutral’ 
style.  
13 Lévinas, 1969, p. 113-117 




necessary. Philosophy in this context is unusual, because this means that I will not include my 
own fieldwork. Any examples I use have been researched by other scholars, and are shaped by 
those scholars’ own foci and concerns. Moreover, what is taken as primary philosophical data – 
the texts of Lévinas and Derrida – would be deemed secondary by most social scientists.15 
Conversely, a philosophical analysis is necessary, because, as has been argued above, the 
hegemonic status of the liberal peace takes the universality of its underlying philosophical 
assumptions for granted, and is therefore trapped in its own Eurocentric, violent, and imperial 
ways. A critical reconsideration of what we think natural with regards to our human condition is 
urgently called for within peace research, if new possibilities for peace are to be sought and 
attempts at peace are to be made. There is a need for peace studies to engage with philosophy in 
order to change its violent practice. 
This is not to say that peace research should restrict itself to philosophical consideration. 
On the contrary, additional research is needed to mediate between the abstractedness of 
philosophical thought and the tangled nature of everyday life, and the complexities of conflict 
settings and of mechanisms and structures that perpetuate inequality and exploitation. Likewise, 
in the thesis at hand I will not be able to offer specific advice as to how politics, policies, or 
projects could or should be newly shaped. Rather, I engage in both a meta-analytical 
consideration of peace research and a foundational discussion on the philosophical assumptions 
with which current peace scholars and practitioners operate. I ask what other philosophical 
approaches there might be, and how our understanding of peace could be shaped in a different 
way, when considering the thought of Lévinas and Derrida. My approach, therefore, is 
theoretical, and focuses on the discursive structure used to uphold the liberal peace condition. 
Any translation into practice will have to follow elsewhere.  
The choice to focus on the philosophical approaches of Lévinas and Derrida has four 
reasons. First, by criticising the approaches to peace, which are based on the assumptions of the 
original social contract16, especially Lévinas, but also Derrida, offer a direct link to the liberal 
peace. Second, Lévinas and Derrida do not present two approaches independent from another. 
With regards to the concern to understanding the possibility of peace, their philosophical 
approaches are intricately entwined; they form a dialogue. Third, bearing in mind the advice of 
James Der Derian and Michael J. Saphiro that alternatives to hegemonic violence are found at the 
                                                
15 See: Adams et al., 2007 
16 For further elaboration on the conceptualisation of an original social contract see chapter 2.1.1.2. 
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margins of an established discourse,17 I believe it important to reintroduce Lévinas’ and Derrida’s 
dialogue on peace into peace research. Last, the two philosophers offer insightful ideas to many 
of the issues and problems the liberal peace is faced with. In this thesis I shall work with a 
restricted number of texts by both philosophers that I regard as exemplary regarding the basic 
theoretical features of both approaches and their implications for the possibility of peace.  
However, I find it also important to state that both Lévinas and Derrida, despite their 
Jewish, and in Lévinas’ case Lithuanian18 as well as in Derrida’s case Algerian19 background, are 
philosophers writing and researching within Western academia and its tradition. That is, despite 
their critical approach to Western thought, they do have certain roles closely linked to academic 
inequality and with it epistemic violence. They are both white, and they are both male. My focus 
on these two philosophers, therefore, might seem absurd to some thinkers critical of the liberal 
project and more in favour of post-colonial theory and de-colonising research. Their concern with 
regards to the mechanisms of exclusion of scholars from most parts of the globe, as well as the 
legitimacy of field research and the structures of power the latter conveys, is to be taken 
seriously.20 However, in my view, it should not lead to a converse discrimination. I shall 
therefore take a pragmatic stance. By merely taking into account the approaches of Lévinas and 
Derrida, I will have to insist on my thesis’ incompleteness with regards to an inclusive 
philosophical critique of the liberal peace. Equally, I will not gain a comprehensive picture on the 
way our human condition could be understood and conceptualised. However, it is, in my view, 
still important not to negate the valuable insights, Lévinas and Derrida have to offer when it 
comes to peace. 
 
1.3  Research Question and Thesis Structure 
 
What follows below, then, is an analysis of the liberal peace and its philosophical foundations, 
which shall be contrasted with an alternative philosophical dialogue on peace held between 
Lévinas and Derrida. As guiding research questions I ask how the approaches of Lévinas and 
Derrida can help to better understand the imperial character of the liberal peace and if, beyond all 
criticism, they are able to provide an alternate vision of peace. Thus, in the second chapter, I shall 
                                                
17 See: Der Derian, 1989, pp. 4-7; Saphiro, 1989, pp. 12-15 
18 See: Bernard-Deonals, 2005, p. 70 
19 See: Ofrat, 2001, p. 3 
20 See for example: Appeltshauser, 2014, pp. 10-18; Kahlenberg, 2014, pp. 1-8 
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introduce the liberal peace, as it viewed by both proponents and opponents. In the third chapter, I 
will present the philosophical approaches of Lévinas and Derrida, to then juxtapose them with the 
liberal peace in the fourth, in which I shall attempt to better explain the imperial character of 




2  Current Affairs – The Peace that Colonises21 
 
Today, the liberal peace is mainly understood in terms of “technical solutions”22 for the building 
of peace in societies that face, or have faced, violent conflicts. Yet, I shall argue in the following 
chapter that the liberal peace, being a “concept, condition and practice”23 all at the same time, is 
highly multifaceted. As a concept, or rather, as Oliver P. Richmond puts it, as discourse and 
framework, the liberal peace entails ideas, as to how a political, social and economic system is to 
be organised. It is presented as the beacon of hope for everlasting prosperity and progress, proven 
by those already living in its condition. It is also a practice, as  
leading states, international organisations and international financial institutions [attempt] to promote 
their version of peace through peace-support interventions, control of international financial 
architecture, support for state sovereignty and the international status quo.24  
With such conceptual and material comprehensiveness, the liberal peace has both scholarly and 
practically, has gained a hegemonic status, fortified by the notion that a liberal peace is desirable 
for as well as acceptable and suitable to all societies and states. Consequently, neither peace 
research nor peacebuilders can currently find a way around it.25 
Yet, the ‘end of history’26 was of short duration, and the liberal peace project has not been 
left unchallenged. In fact, Richmond argues that, after its flourishing years of the 1990s and early 
2000s, the liberal peace is now suffering from a lack of legitimacy and has been accused of being  
ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned 
with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects. It is tied to Western and 
liberal conceptions of the state, to institutions and not to the local.27 
Highly standardised, the peace to be built and spread had become a “peace from IKEA”28, and is 
in danger of being disclosed as “a tragedy masquerading as a farce, as a bonfire of neoliberal 
                                                
21 See: Richmond, 2007, p. 224 
22 Heathershaw, 2008, p. 597 
23 Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 143 
24 Ibid. 
25 See: Cooper, 2007, p. 613; Doyle, 1983, pp. 212-224 & 232; Marshall, 2010, p. 244; Paris, 2002, pp. 637-638; 
Richmond, 2006, pp. 292-295 
26 The ‘end of history’ is a phrase mostly associated with Francis Fukuyama, who, after the end of the Cold War and 
the victory of liberalism, thought conflict and, with it, historical change to have ended for good. (See: Fukuyama, 
2006) 
27 Richmond, 2009, p. 557 
28 Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145. Mac Ginty uses the metaphor of IKEA as the liberal peace thinks that peace can be 
engineered the same way in every society and that it needs the same set of principles wherever it is implemented. 
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certainties”29, disregarding local practices and often cooperating with social elites. According to 
Richmond’s view, this is a peace that colonises, because it allows some people to decide which 
state of affairs is best for all, and to dictate the means and impose the measures, through which 
this desired state can be achieved. The liberal peace, thus, has been recognised in its violence.30 
In this chapter I will try to bring some clarity into the multifaceted nature of the liberal 
peace project, by tracing in detail the argument made above. In the first subchapter, I will 
consider the apparent upside of liberal peace, by subsequently introducing its discourse, condition 
and practice. In the second, I will look at the downside of liberalism, in order to shed some light 
on what is being meant by a violent peace, or a peace that colonises. 
 
2.1  The Liberal Legacy31 
 
When in The Snows of Kilimanjaro, Julian tells his 
friend, ‘The very rich are different from you and me,’ 
his friend replies, ‘Yes, they have more money.’ But 
the liberals are fundamentally different.32 
 
As I have stated above, the liberal peace gained its highest popularity after the end of the Cold 
War and the related downfall of ‘actually existing socialism’. However, its historical background 
as well as the ideological foundations of its political project are not as recent. This becomes 
evident when focus is laid on the liberal character of the peace in question. According to 
Raymond Geuss, the term ‘liberal’ first appeared around 1810-11 in Spain, where it was used to 
label a political party. Only afterwards was a prehistoric account of the term re-constructed, in 
order to legitimise and theoretically fortify its political meaning. Starting almost from the term’s 
introduction, then, ‘liberal’ was used to refer to two things: a theoretical discourse and a specific 
political engagement.33 From the outset it was a concept and a specific political practice. Its 
condition came with a broader political legitimation and institutionalisation of liberal ideas and 
                                                
29 Cooper, 2007, p. 606 
30 See: Cooper, 2007, p. 606; Chandler, 2004, p. 59; Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145; Richmond, 2007, pp. 204 & 224 
31 See: Doyle, 1983, Title 
32 Doyle, 1983, p. 235 
33 See: Geuss, 2002, pp. 312-322 
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values. In the following subchapter I will introduce the liberal peace along the lines of its 
characterisation as ‘concept, condition and practice’.34 
 
 
2.1.1  History and Ideology – Tracing a Concept 
 
The discourse on liberal peace mainly draws its ideas from three different theoretical uses of the 
term liberal: first, from political philosophy; second, from the discipline of international relations; 
and last, from a particular understanding of economy. All three find their beginning in the 
Enlightenment. They are combined in Kant’s theory on Perpetual Peace, which centres around a 
specific notion of the nature of human beings, as well as the social, political and economic 
system that is to be created in order to promote freedom and well-being.35 Below, I will consider 
all three uses of the term. However, as “[t]heories are born in their own age”36, any theoretical 
consideration of the ideas of liberalism has to equally take into account the historical driving 
force that brought them forth.  
 
2.1.1.1  Peace – A History 
 
Historically, Richmond points out, the theoretical roots of the liberal peace can be traced as far 
back as the late Middle Ages, culminating, as mentioned, in the Enlightenment.37 They spring 
from demands for the secularisation of Christian power but readily transform into a debate, on 
how to contain the ambitions of conquest and the greed of rulers, in order to lessen the chance of 
interstate warfare, and at the same time prevent the chaos and horrors of civil war. In their first 
two phases, demands for the peace that was to become liberal, were thus driven by a deep unease 
with regards to both Papal as well as monarchic abuses of power. After that, the early stages of 
the Enlightenment led the thinking about peace onto two different roads. One was taken by the 
Revolution of the English bourgeoisie, which, while also discussing concepts such as welfare and 
                                                
34 Within the spatial and temporal scope of this thesis, this account cannot but remain a sketch. Especially a deeper 
and more intensive study of the historical and ideological precursors of present-day liberalism has to follow 
elsewhere. However, the account given here is regarded as sufficiently detailed to be of relevant use for the 
analysis to follow.  
35 See: Kersting, 1992, pp. 342-347 
36 Kende, 1989, p. 245 
37According to Richmond it is heavily built on the “philosophical and political debates that emerged from the 
writings of Hobbes, Macchiavelli, Abbe St. Pierre, Kant, Rousseau, Locke Paine, Penn, Cobden, Mill, Bentham, 
and Grotius” (Richmond, 2009, p. 559). 
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equality, mainly stressed the notion of peace as economic “utility and profitableness”38, and 
introduced the idea that peace should be sought in the pursuit of protecting private property. The 
other road found its way to pre-revolutionary France, where “human rights and freedom were 
much more the ‘raison’ of their struggle than practical utility or usefulness”39. Interestingly, both 
roads introduced the idea of a social contract that human beings, using their power of reason, in 
order to escape the dangers and threats of the state of nature. But their emphases were different. It 
was Immanuel Kant, who – as “a pragmatic synthesis of Hobbes’ sense of political reality and 
Rousseau’s ideal of justice”40 – combined the two different strands in his treatise on Perpetual 
Peace, and with whom the Enlightenment reached its apex.41  
 
2.1.1.2  The Dawn of Reason 
 
The project of the Enlightenment, Geoffrey G. Harpham argues, was to reassemble the entire 
philosophical discourse into a public debate that is answerable to a truth not dictated by the 
church, the ruler or the nation. The entire cognitive process should be founded in reason, and 
reason alone. According to Kant42, for example, reason not only provides us with the forms 
necessary for objectively true judgements, but also entails the means through which ethical 
certainties can be gained. Putting both theoretical truth and ethical guidance down to reason 
brought with it a new importance for the reasonable and rational individual.43 Arguments were 
brought forth to secure individual freedom, one of which was the idea of the original social 
contract.44 
The basic idea of social contract theories is that human beings are to be protected from the 
threat they pose to each other in the state of nature, through the formation of some sort of 
government. This government is legitimised by an original social contract, to which human 
beings agree thanks to reason. The social contract usually is presented as logical response to a 
                                                
38 Kende, 1989, p. 237 
39 Kende, 1989, p. 238 
40 Kersting, 1992, p. 359 
41 See: Kende, 1989, pp. 234-240 
42 It is to be mentioned at this point that considering Kant as part of the early liberalists is not an uncontested view. 
Geuss for example, regards only the “classical liberalism of Constant, Mill, and Tocqueville” (Geuss, 2002, p. 323) 
as the real liberal position (see: Geuss, 2002, pp. 322-323), whereas Michael W. Doyle clearly considers Kant as a 
precursor of liberal ideals (see: Doyle, 1983, pp. 206-212).  
43 This is shown for example by Kant’s second categorical imperative to never treat a human being only as a means 
to an end, but always also as an end in itself. (See: Kant, 1999, p. 54-55) 
44 See: Haphram, 1994, pp. 531-539; Kant, 1956, B132-B169; Kant, 1999, pp. 319-412; Kersting, 1992, pp. 342-355 
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specific hypothesis on how human beings think and act in a lawless space – the state of nature. 
This state is imagined as violent, immoral and egoistic. Human beings in the state of nature are 
constantly subject to threat, insecurity and possible warfare. In order to prevent this hypothetical 
scenario, the social contract is to limit each individual’s latitude of action, so that it can no longer 
interfere with the freedom of others. Consequently, the task of confining individual freedom is 
given to the ruler, the state, and its legal institutions.45 
However, conceptions of the state of nature, the arguments brought forth for the founding 
of a social contract, as well as the political system to be created, differ from theorist to theorist. 
Hobbes, for example, describes the state of nature as total anarchy, which entails the constant 
threat of violence “of every man, against every man”46. Against the background of constant fear 
of death, reason therefore cannot but suggest the conclusion of a contract, which transfers both 
power and violence to a supreme ruler – the Leviathan – in order to contain individual passion 
and greed. According to Hobbes, the social contract, “once made, […] is irrevocable”47, no 
matter, which means of coercion are being applied by the ruler.48  
This notion is carried on by Kant in his arguing against resistance. However, Kant objects 
to Hobbes that the ruler should not be left unaccountable for any wrongdoing against his 
population. Instead, the latter has to be able to assume that it is protected from any harm done by 
the hands of the ruler. A state, therefore, has to base its founding principles on a republican civil 
constitution that secures freedom, equality and autonomy in interpersonal relations by imposing 
public rights and laws. Two things are important at this point. First, as Kersting writes, Kant does 
not intend the “community of right” to be “a community of solidarity among the needy but a 
community for self-protection among those who have the power to act”49. Second, equality in this 
context only refers to juridical equality, leaving open the possibility of inequality with regard to 
both skills and possessions.50 
The protection of private property within the social contract is also advanced by John 
Locke, yet for different reasons. According to Locke, the state of nature is less anarchic than 
described by Hobbes. Social norms to respect the “life, health, liberty, and possessions”51 of 
                                                
45 See: Atterton, 1992, p. 59; Bahner, 1984; p. 6, Richmond, 2007, p. 222 
46 Hobbes, 1969, p. 188 
47 Bagby, 2002, p.74 
48 See: Hobbes, 1968, 183-201 
49 Kersting, 1992, p. 345 
50 See: Kant, 1992, pp. A232-A280; Kersting, 1992, pp. 345-354 
51 Locke, 1980, p. 9 
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others already exist, and so does trade. Insecurity is only evoked with the development of 
inequality. Reason then leads to the formation a civil society and a government, with the intention 
to protect the “lives, liberties and estates [emphasis added]”52 of its citizens.53 However, this 
government, unlike that envisioned by Hobbes and Kant, can be dissolved, should it no longer 
serve the preservation of self-interest.54 
Yet, however different the theories, they all introduced peace as a form of governance 
based on the original will of the people. Thus, from a philosophical perspective the heritage of 
Enlightenment lies in “ideals of political emancipation, universal rights, the autonomous subject, 
and the reign of reason”55, politically unified through the social contract, as opposed to civil war 
or the arbitrary rule of monarchs. This idea of peace anchored in the hope that humankind will 
necessarily and constantly progress toward the better, if not the Good. As reason spreads, Kant 
argues in his essay on Perpetual Peace, more and more states will be founded on republican 
constitutions. Created thus, they will be less likely to go to war, and in the end form, if not a 
world republic, then a federation that will bind all states together under international law. Within 
this federation, the cosmopolitan right to hospitality is to guarantee prosperity through especially 
economic exchange among states.56 While this subchapter focused more on the philosophical 
background that lead to Kant’s introduction of republican constitutionalism, I shall now turn to 
liberal thoughts on both international relations and free trade. 
 
2.1.1.3  Balance-of-Power versus International Law 
 
Though discussed most prominently in the discipline of international relations, the distinction 
between an international arena dominated by balance-of-power politics and one being structured 
by cooperation and international law was already discussed during the Enlightenment. 57 
However, with the development of international relations as a discipline, the two scenarios took 
hold within opposing schools of thought regarding the international sphere: realism and 
                                                
52 Locke, 1980, p. 66 
53 See: Locke, 1980, pp. 8-9 
54 See: Bagby, 2002, p. 99; Locke, 1980, pp. 8-9 & 66; Macpherson, 1980, pp.xvi-xxi 
55 Harpham, 1994, p. 532 
56 See: Behnke, 2008, pp. 518-521; Kende, 1989, p. 240 
57 See: Kant, 1992, p. 313 
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liberalism.58 Therefore, I will argue that, while realists draw on Hobbes’ state of nature in order 
to describe the international sphere, liberalists draw on Locke’s. Both have in common the 
consideration that the state is the most important entity in the international realm. Internationally, 
the state takes the place of the individual. And already the views of liberalism and realism beg 
only at securing its own interests, which revolve around gaining power. Unsurprisingly, 
cooperation and social norms are thought of as scarce and fragile. Like in the Hobbesian state of 
nature the threat of war is always present. The international sphere is characterised by anarchy 
and chaos, and the only way to prevent war from happening is to maintain a balance of power.59 
Conversely, liberalism regards this kind of politics as disrupted with the introduction of 
“liberal principles and institutions”60. To liberalists, the international sphere is not adequately 
described by chaos and anarchy. As in the state of nature described by Locke, cooperation does 
happen, and so does trade. This, Andrew Moravcsik argues, is because, even in the realm of 
international relations, the individual, its freedom and interests never cease to be the primary 
point of reference. Hence, civil society does not only shape the process, through which the state 
of nature is left behind and a government is formed; it also influences the way international 
relations are structured. “[I]ndividuals and privately-constituted groups”61 of both domestic and 
international civil society try to secure their interests by steering governmental actions within as 
well as among states. As a consequence, the international sphere, too, leaves the state of nature in 
an “evolutionary social process”62 that increasingly protects private interests by institutionalising 
their fulfilment.63 
In short, the liberal road, if walked, will leave war and chaos behind, and – by securing 
individual freedom and interest through international cooperation, law and trade – lead to peace, 
progress and prosperity. What role, then, does trade play in all of this? 
 
                                                
58 The description of the realist and liberalist tradition in international relations here draws on an earlier exam paper 
by the author of this thesis, handed in on the 17th October, 2011, at the Center for Peace Studies, University of 
Tromsø. (See therefor: Bänninger, 2011) 
59 See: Morgenthau, 1994, p. 34-38; Richmond, 2007, p. 212. This is, of course, a rather crude description of the 
realist tradition, which – with the changing of the international sphere –has itself undergone theoretical change in 
order to better explain phenomena such as international agreements or transnational institutions within a structure 
of international relations that is still best explained in realist terms. (See for example: Waltz, 2000, pp. 40-41) 
60 Doyle, 1983, p. 205 
61 Moravcsik, 1992, p. 2 
62 Moravcsik, 1992, p. 9 
63 See: Doyle, 1992, pp.228-232; Moravcsik, 1992, pp. 8-9 & 36-38; Richmond, 2007, p. 212 
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2.1.1.4  The Economy of Peace 
 
At its core, the economic aspect of the liberal peace lies in the assumption that states are less 
likely to engage in war, if they “trade a lot with each other”64. To secure peace, economies ought 
to be without borders, and trade freely. As said, this idea is of British origin and was first 
introduced by William Penn. Later, Jeremy Bentham accentuated the economic utility of 
international laws that reduce the “sizes of armies and arms”65, and promote the emancipation of 
the conquered colonies. John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, argues that free trade is necessary for 
the formation of peacefully regulated international relations. Politically, Mill’s ideas were 
advanced by Richard Cobden, who is still mentioned in the context of economic post-war 
peacebuilding.66 Yet, the perhaps most famous founding father of “[l]iberal economic theory”67 is 
Adam Smith. According to Smith, trade is a natural affinity of human beings, and should be 
enhanced via a “system of natural liberty”68 – the free market – based on the institution of private 
property and controlled but by individual owners, as opposed to the government. The market 
produces wealth through the division of labour, and is therefore best organised internationally, 
and free from any physical barriers or governmental restrictions. Consequently, an international 
economic order is dependent on “rules and institutions” that secure an “unimpeded circulation, 
across sovereign borders, of goods and money”69.70 
This system matters to liberal peace theory, as it is placed within a specifically liberal 
conception of history, which resumes Kant’s idea of humankind constantly progressing toward 
the better. According to this conception, progress is initiated by economic relations, of which 
liberal political institutions are only a consequence. Hence, “political liberalism is the product of 
economic liberalism”71. They are connected to one another, as private property is not only an 
economic principle, but also a right. It is this double character of private property that leads 
constitutionalism to apply the rule of law on both the economic and the political sphere. In other 
words, a free market is not enough to secure a peaceful order. Only when combined with the 
                                                
64 Weede, 2010, p. 206 
65 Kende, 1989, p. 240 
66 See: Kende, 1989, pp. 237-243; Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 234; Pugh, 2005, p. 24 
67 Doyle, 1983, p. 231 
68 Smith, 2005, p. 560 
69 Mandelbaum, 200, pp. 11-12 
70 See: Mandelbaum, 2002, pp. 37 & 11-12; Pugh, 2005, p. 24; Smith, 2005, pp. 18 & 491-560; Weede, 2010, pp. 
206-207 
71 Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 234 
15 
 
spread of democratic institutions and increasing international regulations, does it fulfil the liberal 
promise of peace.72 Accordingly, the liberal peace cannot be reduced to democratic or capitalist 
peace; it integrates both political and economic liberal principles into a “particular kind”73 of 
peace. It is to the condition of this peace I shall turn in the following subchapter.74 
 
 
2.1.2  A Beautiful Friendship – The Liberal Peace Condition 
 
The term liberal has now been introduced, first, as a particular strand of philosophy that focuses 
on the importance of individual freedom, and the political institutions needed in order to 
guarantee it. Second, it was seen to stand for a theoretical lineage in international relations that 
objects to the realist balance-of-power by pointing toward the fact of cooperation, 
institutionalisation, the rule of law, and agreement in the international sphere. Last, it represents 
an economic theory that favours the free market, the pursuit of wealth, and the protection of 
private property. All three approaches promise to ensure peace, and each aspect of this threefold 
use of the term liberal is already represented in Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the liberal peace condition does not exclude any aspect of it.  
Only what used to be a republican constitution, a federation of states under international 
law, and the cosmopolitan right to hospitality in Kantian terms has been politically translated by 
Woodrow Wilson into what is today known as the “Wilsonian triad”75. This triad describes a 
world shaped by democracy, international arms control, and a free-market economy. Though 
Wilson did not see his vision fulfilled in his own life-time, the end of the Cold War, as 
mentioned, does seem to leave the world with “no realistic alternative to liberalism”76. From the 
ashes of realist balance-of-power politics rose one “set of principles binding all countries in the 
world, […]. These are democracy, free markets, human rights, […] peaceful behaviour toward 
other countries”77, neoliberal “development, a vibrant civil society and multilaterism”78.79 
                                                
72 Thereby, those advocating less interference from the government in economic affairs are considered neoliberals. 
(See: Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 30) 
73 Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 273 
74 See: Mandelbaum, 2002, pp. 30, 231-236, 265-271 & 295; Richmond, 2009, p. 559 
75 Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 24 
76 Geuss, 2002, p. 320 
77 Purdy, in: Bishai, 2004, p. 64 
78 Richmond, 2006, p. 298 
79 See: Chandler, 2004, pp. 59-60; Doyle, 1983, p. 216; Mandelbaum, 2002, pp. 24-25 
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However, despite there being no prominent counter-ideology to liberalism, the liberal 
peace has not become politically universal. It is maintained among a specific group of states. This 
group carries different names, examples of which are the ‘West’, or the ‘core’ – with the United 
States being “the core of the core”80. As all Western states embrace liberal principles, this 
geographically limited peace lead to the conclusion that “a separate peace exists among liberal 
states”81.82 Thereby, the “liberal family”83 is regarded as fundamentally different, and distinct 
from the rest of the world. The introducing citation of Michael Doyle almost seems to suggest, 
that the morally progressing, economically prosperous liberals, who show no evidence of deep-
rooted conflicts of interest, are of a different quality than the rest of humankind. Clearly, this 
fundamentally different zone of peace needs to be expanded, in order for the rest of the world to 
have a shot at harvesting its fruits. Knowing, and living in peace, Richmond concludes, 
legitimates the transfer of the liberal peace to places that lack it. Facing zones of violent conflicts, 
the liberal peace becomes a mission.84 
 
 
2.1.3  “Clean and Clear”85 – The Practice of Missions and Operations 
 
Though the end of the Cold War did bring with it a triumphal procession of liberalism, history 
did not end. It witnessed a change in the nature of war. No longer fought between states, wars in 
most cases moved into society and became civil. Together, the victory of liberal ideas and the 
simultaneous increase of civil warfare gave rise to demands for the United Nations (UN) and 
other international organisations to intervene more directly and comprehensively in the affairs of 
states, whose societies were at war. Peace operations, Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk argue, 
were revolutionised. While traditional peacekeeping – such as it took place in Angola or 
Cambodia – mainly consisted in providing “lightly armed military forces to monitor ceasefires or 
patrol neutral buffer zones between former combatants”86, peace now encompassed transforming 
and restructuring an entire state, its society and economy. The liberal peace became 
                                                
80 Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 7 
81 Doyle, 1983, 232 
82 Importantly, as Doyle points out, this does not mean that wars do not occur between liberal and illiberal states. 
(See: Doyle, 1983, p. 206) 
83 Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 30 
84 See: Doyle, 1983, pp. 205-232; Rhodes, 2003, p. 140; Richmond, 2006, p. 298; Richmond, 2007, p. 219 
85 Oneal/Russet, 2001, Title 
86 Paris/Sisk, 2009, p. 4 
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peacebuilding. During the 1990s, so-called peacebuilding missions not only expanded with 
regard to their scope, but they also became more extensive in temporal terms. In addition to post-
conflict settings, peacebuilding started to engage into the phases of pre-conflict and conflict.87 As 
a consequence, peace interventions came to be  
complex forms of global coordination involving multileveled state-non-state agreements, and 
extensive division of labour between governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies, civil 
society groups and militaries88. 
Opposed to specific programs, such as “security sector reform, transitional justice or economic 
recovery”89, peacebuilding unifies these programs together with  
ceasefire monitoring, formalized peace negotiations, Disarmament Demobilizaiton and Reintegration 
(DDR), […] civil society capacity-building, post-peace accord elections, civil service reform, good-, 
marketization, and economic restructuring90 
into a highly standardised grand strategy.91 
As it is usually the case with terms that aim at comprehensiveness, peacebuilding is not 
homogeneously defined. Accordingly, John Heathershaw, who agues that there are “multiple 
discourses of the liberal peace”92, proposes an analytical shift away from an unified conception of 
peacebuilding, and considers peacebuildings a more accurate term for the current state of affairs. 
However, there are certain aspects that can be generally ascribed to peacebuilding operations: 
first, its main actors are “leading states, international organizations and international financial 
institutions [IFIs]”93, as well as a vast amount of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); 
second, it is said to be specifically designed to prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict; and, 
third, it is approached with the idea of “peace-as-governance”94. This latter notion of peace 
includes the building of state institutions – preferably liberal, democratic, and market-oriented – 
as well as the governance of civil society through the introduction of values that fortify the 
political system and that simultaneously regulate, control and protect the individuals living in it. 
                                                
87 This linear understanding of a conflict transgressing from ‘pre-’ via conflict to ‘post-’ is criticised by John Paul 
Lederach. Conflict, he argues, and the healing and reconciliation that are thought to follow it, cannot be thought of as 
subsequent phases. After a ceasefire, violence continues. The space of a conflict is “highly dynamic and 
unpredictable” (Lederach, 2010, p. 45). Thus, rather that moving in a linear pattern, violent conflict and processes of 
peace interweave circularly. (See: Lederach/Lederach, 010, pp. 11-45) 
88 Duffield, 2007, p. 114 
89 Call/Cousens, 2008, p. 3 
90 Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 144 
91 See: Call/Cousens, 2008, p. 3; Cortright, 2008, pp. 4-5; Duffield, 2007, pp. 115-116; Heathershaw, 2008, p. 597; 
Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 144; Paris/Sisk, 2009, pp. 1-7 
92 Heathershaw, 2008, p. 603 
93 Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 144 
94 Richmond, 2007, p. 211 
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That is, as Richmond points out, no matter what specific focus peacebuilding has, its outcome 
mirrors the ideas of the “earliest political theorists in the Western tradition and the form of 
government required to create a durable peace”95. In liberal terms, this means that a state either 
immersed in violent conflict, or threatened by its (re)occurrence is asked to make specific liberal 
transitions in the political, social and economic sphere.96  
Consequently, Richmond argues that the differences with regard to how peacebuilding is 
to be understood, are gradational and rather than being proof of multiple discourses, still operate 
within the framework and grand strategy of the liberal peace.97 In fact, as I shall argue below, the 
voices outside the liberal discourse are not heard. Their bodies go hungry, and their subjectivity is 
denied. 
 
2.2.  Liberal Imperialism 
 
The international system was therefore like a fixed 
price menu from which a diner could accept or reject 
different items. He or she could choose to skip the 
hors d’oeuvre, or the main course or the dessert – or 
go hungry altogether.98 
 
A liberal peace, resting on the Enlightenment’s ideals of a governance based on human reason 
and ideas of constant progress, to be exported into the entire world, in order for the liberal peace 
                                                
95 Richmond, 2007, p. 211 
96 See: Heathershaw, 2008, p. 603; Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 144; Paris, 2002, pp. 637-638; Paris/Sisik, 2009, pp. 1-7; 
Richmond, 2007, p. 211 
97  With regard to the gradation of peacebuilding, Richmond differentiates between a hyper-conservative, a 
conservative, an orthodox, and an emancipatory model of peacebuilding. The first addresses military interventions, 
such as they have been conducted in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The conservative model is less 
militarised, but still consists of top-down approaches, mainly led by the World Bank, the UN, and the US, whereby 
the building of peace is often approached via conditionality. While the orthodox model still also consists in top-down 
approaches, it is more aware of the importance of local ownership and hence equally advocates the bottom-up 
peacebuilding by NGOs. Last, the emancipatory model often criticises the coercive and conditional intervention of 
top-down approaches, and proposes an engagement that is more concerned with human needs and social justice. It is, 
according to Richmond, still liberal, as it claims the universality of liberal values, which are often dictated by donor 
countries (see: Richmond, 2007, p. 214-215). Similarly, Heathershaw distinguishes between state-building as being 
conservative, democratic peacebuilding as being orthodox, and supporting the development of a strong civil society 
as being emancipatory (see: Heathershaw, 2008, p. 604). On the other hand, Charles T. Call and Elisabeth M. 
Cousens propose the distinction among a maximalist, a minimalist and a moderate standard of peacebuilding (see: 
Call/Cousens, 2008, p. 7). Yet, Richmond argues that these different approaches are not distinct in interventionist 
practices. Often, they intertwine and one is thought to more or less linearly lead to the other – from the hyper-
conservative to the emancipatory – as a society progresses from conflict to peace. (See: Richmond, 2007, pp. 215-
218)  
98 Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 39 
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ever to expand: this is, in its essence, the above-described liberal heritage that the world is faced 
with today. It is a victorious heritage, as it has presently no serious opponent. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the liberal peace has not remained uncriticised. 
Thereby two forms of criticism exist. One is operational, trying to improve peacebuilding 
techniques within the existing liberal framework.99 The other is more fundamental. To it, 
Mandelbaum’s casual reference to the ‘fixed price menu’ seems disquietingly pointing to 
something else than the unquestioned victory of the liberal model. It points to those who do in 
fact go hungry and the gap their absence leaves in the liberal conception of history. For, the 
liberal interpretation of world history, thus writes Rob B. J. Walker, comes with an embarrassing 
subtext regarding ethnocentrism, racism, colonialism, economic greed, etc.100 It silences the 
measures imposed and wars fought by those in power – the core – in order to uphold the political 
and economic system as it is. By introducing the liberal system as naturally evolved – and 
therefore universal –, its imperial tendencies are generously overlooked; as is its increased 
interventionism and the way “cookie-cutter approaches”101 to peace silence the voices of the 
people concerned.102  
Another story is told on the margins of the liberal peace discourse, just as “[e]very order 
rests on a forgetting of the exclusion practices through which one set of meanings has been 
institutionalised and various other possibilities have been marginalised.”103 Following Shapiro’s 
and Der Derian’s advice, I shall, in this chapter, go to these margins of political thought, theory 
and practice, in order to make sense of the other side of the liberal track record.104 I will do this 
by first looking at the above-mentioned subtext of the liberal peace history. Second, I shall focus 
on the imperial character of the liberal peace. Last, my attention is brought to a call from within 
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2.2.1  The Other Side of History 
 
A specific kind of pain, Harpham argues, comes along with the reason-seeking ideals of 
theEnlightenment. It is the pain of the private subject asked to submit itself to a truth not 
compatible with interest, pleasure or desire. The Enlightenment, he concludes, was hence not 
only about the protection of individual freedom. The ideas brought forth to secure individual 
freedom equally called to life a “statist, nationalist repression, administered society, [and] a 
disseminated subject”105. Similarly, Andreas Behnke introduces Kant’s Perpetual Peace as the 
death of the political, because the tranquillity it seeks is not of this world: It is transcendental. 
Life, Behnke continues, means conflict and antagonism. It means difference. In contrast to this, 
Perpetual Peace seeks a teleological progression to perfection unified in reason and peace. Yet, a 
peace based on this unifying vision necessarily has to become involved in a process of 
“ontological eradication of Difference and the operation of an ethno- and tempocentric 
epistemology”106. A new107 hierarchy of humankind is introduced, with the European subject 
being at the top.108 
Haphram and Behnke point toward two aspects of violence not mentioned in the liberal 
interpretation of history. The first looks at aspects of violence within the state-making process. 
The second lies in the way non-European cultures have been treated during the time of 
colonisation and beyond. As to the first, Charles Tilly offers an insightful introduction by 
pointing out the different levels and grades of violence used by those in power in the process of 
state formation. This process, Tilly argues, started long before ideas of a modern state were 
brought into being. Thus, “every European government before the French Revolution relied on 
indirect rule via local magnates”109. Additionally, they allied with pirates, bandits and local 
power holders. An alliance, which blurred the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence, or rather, which regarded ‘legitimate’ as anything assisting those in power. Later then, 
power was monopolised by eliminating potential local rivals and creating police forces, following 
                                                
105 Harpham, 1994, p. 532 
106 Behnke, 2008. p. 513 
107 The hierarchy introduced by the Enlightenment is new, as every empire – Greek, Roman, Ottoman, Russian, and 
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109 Tilly, 1985, p. 174 
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the order of the government. The state-making process is hence not as noble as often portrayed, 
as the state’s purpose was not necessarily to bring peace to its population. Rather, it was the result 
of a long process of pacification and co-optation, through which potential rivals to the sovereign 
were eliminated, and the latter’s power, operating closely with the private economy and profiting 
from its trading business, was fortified.110  
Accordingly, Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey argue that the liberal democracy is not, as 
often portrayed, a natural and timeless political formation. The liberal democracy is a product of 
industrialisation and the civic revolutions connected to the Enlightenment. With it, the newly 
evolved bourgeoisie and middle classes sought to institutionalise the protection of their economic 
advantage, concentrating around private property. The liberal democracy hence always entails a 
vertical differentiation along class lines, which delegitimises other forms of democratic 
organisation. Equally, Crawford Brough Machpherson calls the liberal democracy as a system of 
power, as it institutes rules upon the individual aimed at both transferring violence from the 
private to the public realm and upholding certain (power-)relations between individuals, groups 
and communities – such as classes. In sum, the violence of the sovereign was not merely 
instituted by the reason-lead will of the people; it also followed the logic of private interests held 
by those in power. As industrial power, and the need for resources grew, this logic, then, was 
imposed on the rest of the world, where early means for peacebuilding practices were tested in 
the form of counterinsurgency tactics.111 
Classical counterinsurgency took place within an imperial and state-centric setting. 
Applied in colonies, it was not confronted with questions of legitimacy or issues of sovereignty. 
Its aim was to lead the “colonial subject” towards “European levels of cultural enlightenment”112. 
Where this project failed, the ‘colonial subject’ was to be left alone in his “gloriously isolated 
state of pre-modern savagery”113. Colonial warfare, Alex Marshall writes, was hence based on the 
positivist notion that all humanity is on a path of cultural evolution toward the Enlightenment. 
However, the tactics of counterinsurgency were often brutal, and not at all in line with the 
evolutionary process, they pursued. This gap between theory and practice eventually lead to the 
idea of “peaceful penetration”114. Insurgents were no longer to be pacified by violence, but 
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through the building of roads and schools as well as through the provision of medical, economic 
and governance assistance. Cultural progression was sought via economic wealth. It is this 
program of peaceful penetration that, according to Marshall, portrays an early form of the liberal 
peace practice. But even late-colonial practices were by no means peaceful. Still, the so-called 
savages were introduced as having an “unchanging, primitive, and almost childlike nature”115. 
Their status as politically, socially and culturally mature subjects was, thus, denied. Insurgencies, 
such as those in in British India were often knocked down violently, and exploitation as well as 
cultural dislocation and, most cruelly, slave tradeing marked the trail, colonial powers left 
behind.116 
Accordingly, Roland Paris argues that peacebuilding is not merely a neutral technique. It 
is a normative “mission civilisatrice”117 that globalises and supports the mode of governance 
implemented in the West. Nevertheless, Paris relativizes the civilising mission of peacebuilding 
by arguing that, unlike colonial conquests, it does not aim at extracting resources from the 
countries intervened in. Nevertheless, however different from colonial practices, peacebuilding 
missions are still but the “latest chapter of the globalisation of the international society”118 that 
began with European overseas explorations in the 15th century.119 With this, Paris points to an 
important aspect of history that often gets lost in its telling. History is not, as usually interpreted 
by social or political scientists, the stringing together of sealed categories, where the period 
before and after a certain date – such as 1492, 1945, 1989 or 9/11 – cannot be considered as being 
of the same quality. Continuity is often the more permanent director of the world’s play.120 Seen 
this way, the condition and practices of the liberal peace are not only enqueued in historically 
grown practices of domination and subordination; questions have to be raised as to how they 
carry them on.  
The hierarchy of humankind, for example, slips back into the liberal discourse, when 
Mandelbaum, compares international relations to a game of chess, in which “some pieces are 
more valuable than others, with the king having the highest value of all.”121 In this game, cultural 
innovation can only take place in the core. With the rise of the West, the periphery is still made to 
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import civilisation, as it was during colonial times, when “India […] supplied new words – 
bungalow, maharajah, thug – and unfamiliar food – curries – to the metropolis”, while England 
brought it “the English language, modern government and the railroad”122. Thankfully, too, this 
party of chess shields “peaceful, prosperous Europe” from the disorders of “impoverished, 
chaotic Africa […] [with] a large body of water”123.124  
Another example of historical continuity is found by looking at Haiti. Ever since its 
independence from France in 1804, Noam Chomsky argues, it has been subject to breaches of its 
sovereignty led by the US. Being the first country to free itself from colonisation, Haiti was to 
pay a bitter price. Not only was it refused recognition by the US until it provided a convenient 
export destination for the increasing number of freed slaves in 1862; it was also faced with huge 
indemnity demands by France as punishment for its won independence. Despite its economic 
damages, international society still regards the imposition of this indemnity as a just measure. So 
just, in fact, that Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown with the assistance of both France and 
the US after having asked France for compensation. This intervention was not the first and, 
according to Chomsky, not the most extreme. This latter title he reserves for the 1915 invasion 
lead by Wilson in order to pave the floor for US corporations to ‘unselfishly’ and ‘fatherly’ take 
over the country – as it was written in the New York Times. Interventions continued, such as the 
plan of USAID and the World Bank to save Haiti from its social and economic horrors through 
neoliberal reforms at the time Ronald Reagan was in office, or the 2004 peace mission.125 Yet it 
is the invasion by Wilson, the political father of the liberal condition, which strikes a chord here. 
How does the killing of thousands of Haitians – according to a Haitian historian, 15,000 – and the 
reintroduction of virtual slavery add up to the actions of a peace visionary?  
Aside from the bipolar conflict between East and West, the liberal core, thus Barkawi and 
Laffey conclude, has been fighting another in conflict along the other two cardinal directions. 
However, the conflict between North and South is not overt. Its language follows a different 
logic. It is articulated through arguments of justice, law, the necessity of order and moral 
obligation. It speaks of just wars and responsibilities to protect, but it is nonetheless imperial, and 
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has since the end of colonisation never legitimised intervention as much as it does today.126 It, 
too, already has a name. It is called liberal imperialism and to it I will now turn.  
 
 
2.2.2  The Path to Empire 
 
Most critiques on the imperial nature of liberalism concern the “unilateral, even domineering 
actions”127 of the US. Especially interventionist practices after 9/11 mark a shift in international 
peacebuilding engagement. According to Richmond, a move can be recognised towards 
conservative peacebuilding models, which seek to implement liberal policies more aggressively 
than before.128 According to Linda Bishai, this has to do with the US seeing the legitimacy of its 
power threatened. She writes that power, “which loses its legitimacy tends to give way to 
violence in order to maintain control”129. Additionally, she sees the global military dominance of 
the US as a clear marker of imperialism. Less clear is the characterisation of the ‘US empire’. 
Unlike European imperialism, the imperialism of the US is often not regarded as destructive and 
subsuming. The American aim of spreading liberalism across the globe reinvents. That is, 
cultures and states are drawn into it voluntarily and transformed accordingly. Far from being 
imperial, the official story goes, what spreads globally is a network that does not coerce 
affiliation but attracts new members due to its moral and rational superiority. Of course, as 
Edward Rhodes writes, “[p]eace is a praiseworthy goal. Freedom and human rights are good”130. 
However, much of the legitimacy ascribed to the liberal model is rhetoric. The liberal network 
does not happen by itself. It is created, among other things, through the military power of the US, 
which is hegemonic, unilateral, globally applied, and aggressively used. Hence, what might seem 
to the US as passive enjoyment of the “fruits of a globally desirable model of political freedom 
and capitalist production”131 is actually something coercive and violent.132 
Still, the tendency toward imperialism does not only refer to the present actions of the US-
lead Western alliance. It lies, Bishai argues, within liberal theory itself. More specifically, it 
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springs from the wish that a moral certainty is found in individual freedom and equality, which is 
so fundamentally rational that it cannot but be universally desirable and globally applicable. It is 
this certainty, without any trace of scepticism that holds the danger of illiberalism and eventually 
leads to imperialism. This point is important, as it shows that the illiberal and ultimately imperial 
danger of liberalism does not lay in one single aspect of the liberal peace, it pervades all of it: 
concept, condition and practice. This fact is very well captured by Jedediah Purdy, who writes,  
First, there is one set of principles binding all countries in the world, whether their governments 
acknowledge or ignore them. These are democracy, free markets, human rights, and peaceful behaviour 
toward other countries. Second, we embody these principles, and we have the last word as to what they 
mean and where they have been grievously violated. Third, we will enforce these principles with our 
unparalleled military strength and will not permit competitors to arise and challenge our supreme 
position. In us, and only in us, power and righteousness coincide.133 
Clearly then, then, the liberal project treads the “path to Empire”134. The globe is not structured 
along the political, economic and social lines of liberalism due to a voluntary network, but as a 
result of power impalances. In its most benign form, this power manifests in the fact that states do 
not have any other option than to sign onto the liberal project in order to survive. The American 
empire might not rest upon territorial conquest and control, but it permeates deep into 
individuals’ lives, and it does so consciously.135  
This is made clear by Robert Cooper, who describes the liberal condition as postmodern. 
To him, the postmodern era is characterised by, first, a diffusion between domestic and foreign 
issues; second, the refusal to use violent means for dispute resolution; third, an increasing 
irrelevance of borders; fourth the pursuit of security through transparency; and fifth, the 
awareness of mutual interdependency and vulnerability. Yet, threats face the free and postmodern 
world, both from classical modern states – such as China or India –, and from ‘pre-modern’ or 
‘failed’ states. Old-fashioned in nature, these illiberal states need other, rougher measures to keep 
them in check. Especially the “pre-modern chaos”136 would be best handled by the means of a 
new colonisation. But, as no state wants to take on such a responsibility – it is the regrettable end 
of colonisation, which in fact brought forth the present chaos in the first place – a new kind of 
imperialism is called for. The character of this new imperialism, Cooper notes, is twofold. First, it 
is voluntary and acts via the global economy and its main regulators: the IMF and the World 
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Bank, both of which assist states who wish to find their way back to the prosperous trail of the 
global market. Second, it is neighbourly, as military assistance, as well as “police, judges, prison 
officers, central bankers, and others” 137 , are provided with friendly intentions to a state 
recovering from ‘failure’. Neighbours organise and monitor elections, just as they train local 
polices forces. As cooper applies the concept of neighbourhood to the entire world, his vision of a 
cooperative empire will ultimately have to be global.138  
Cooper’s article is multi-layered and diffuse. It points toward the superiority of the post-
modern condition, while at the same time presenting it as threatened by those who have not yet 
reached its developmental stage. In other words, arguments of moral authority mix with the 
analysis of potential threats. Perhaps this diffuseness is due to the need of rhetoric to bridge the 
paradox liberalism has brought itself into by pursuing liberal moral ends through illiberal means. 
However diffuse, the ‘fixed price menu’ is nonetheless clear: “Not learning English means giving 
up certain kinds of ambition. Not adopting liberal trade rules means missing entire streams of the 
global economy.”139 Not making the right choices for a people means facing sanctions, if not 
intervention.  
In the following section I will consider different levels, on which the liberal empire is 
maintained and expanded, without aiming at presenting a full and comprehensive picture. I shall, 
first, provide insights into global economic and political structures so as to, second, show how 
they are used to legitimise certain international behaviours, and, third, illustrate how they 
influence the way peace projects are planned and implemented. 
 
2.2.2.1  The Fixed Price Menu 
 
Many “choices made for war-torn societies” Michael Pugh argues, “serve to maintain wealth 
imbalances”140, as they are. The institutional prioritisation of those, who have attained and 
safeguard economic power, both intra- and inter-nationally, illustrates another aspect of 
continuity within the advancement of liberal ideals throughout history. Whereas democracy as 
such is not an unworthy goal – as liberal democracies do somehow mediate the will of the 
population – it nonetheless expresses the institutionalised will that private property be protected. 
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Democracies therefore perpetuate both the division of society along class lines, as well as the 
“capitalist socio-economic order”141 as such. Liberal spaces, Barkawi and Laffey argue, are 
created to fortify the international, capitalist power of certain states and groups through geo-
strategic, political and economic means – which mostly relinquish the use of direct force. In this 
context, the Western states can be regarded as one  
Western state – ‘a massive, institutionally complex and messy agglomeration of state power centred on 
North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australasia. This [ultra-imperialist military economic order] 
[…] preceded and made possible the internationalization of capital, the interpretation of the major 
capitalist economies and processes of transnational class formation142.143 
 
Importantly, this interpretation does not separate economic from political concerns. Economic 
affairs are not, as often presented, a natural and value-free pursuit of homo economicus, thought 
to portray a rationally calculating and inherently capitalistic, entrepreneurial self. Economy is 
heavily entangled with politics, which channels economic action in a deeply imbalanced way. 
How then, does peacebuilding fit into this? 
As part of the ‘capitalist, socio-economic order’, peacebuilding does not exclusively 
follow the humanitarian ambition of preventing violence from reoccurring. The liberal peace, 
Pugh argues, is a “fluid response to the logic of industrial and post-industrial capitalism”144; 
perpetuated by the economic dimension of peacebuilding, i.e. market liberalisation. Measures 
undertaken as part of the economic dimension of peacebuilding are privatisation and a reduction 
of – or rather a change in – the state’s role, both of which are to support the quest for private gain. 
Underlying these measures is the hope that privatisation leads to foreign investment, increased 
production and export relations.145 The two most influential actors promoting liberal economic 
reforms in the context of peacebuilding operations are the World Bank and the IMF146. Typically, 
Mandelbaum writes, reforms follow a conditional loan issued by the IMF. These conditions are 
often disadvantageous to the population of the loan-receiving country, initiating a phase of 
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intense and prolonged economic austerity. As a consequence of market liberalisation, public and 
collective spaces as well as the success rates of local economic initiatives often diminish.147 
Even the introduction of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
made no change with regards to this matter. In Kosovo, for example, economic reconstruction 
initiatives have often stated the necessity of social justice, poverty reduction and the enhancement 
of public services, in order for the national economy to succeed. In 2002-2003, however, the IMF 
simultaneously advised “curbs on spending, […] control on wages, social welfare, public sector 
reforms and compensation for workers thrown out of work by privatisation”148. Hence, several 
problematic issues remain unaddressed by MDGs. First, structural violence,149 which springs 
from the so-called ‘zone of peace’ – the West – and is perpetuated through policies that 
discriminate against local communities, denying them any options in economic innovation, is 
continuously ignored. Core capitalist economies do not liberalise their markets; they protect 
them. Equally, they favour donor goods and foreign expertise over local production and 
employment. At the same time, they put pressure on foreign economies so as to reduce state 
welfare. Second, MDGs-inspired programs still think of the poor and those in situations of 
violent conflict as failing in their entrepreneurial nature. To this failure, then, one therapeutic 
solution is presented, to boost the economy of post-conflict or developing societies, no matter if 
the society in question resides in East Timor or in Haiti. Last, Pugh argues, that the reduction of 
public goods still remains “the order of the day”150 and even programs with emancipatory aims 
follow the logic of a discourse that favours capitalist interests for the pursuit of a ‘good life’. 
Therefore, Pugh concludes, “economic wisdom resides with the powerful. Political inequality 
leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives”151. This is not to 
change soon, as IFIs take an increasingly active role in peace processes.152  
In sum, it can be argued that the liberal peace, and especially liberal peacebuilding assists 
in upholding the present ‘capitalist socio-economic order’, which is founded on inequality. At 
this point, I would like to stress that this is often done unintentionally. Many professionals active 
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in peacebuilding hold commendable goals, and their wish to assist the development or peace 
process of a society is genuine. Yet, being embedded in the international system as it is today, 
peacebuilding is subject to a discourse and its politics, both of which serve to legitimise and 
preserve the existing power and wealth distribution. The necessity of economic liberalisation in 
the pursuit of economic growth is only one aspect of this discourse, although a quite significant 
one. However, to put this liberalisation into practice, peace operations need some kind of moral 
justification. Therefor, one source for legitimisation is found in the concepts of human security 
and the responsibility to protect (R2P).  
 
2.2.2.2  A Responsibility to Protect? 
 
By placing the safety of the individual at the centre of international security calculations, the 
concept of human security combines threat analyses with ideas concerning the nature of human 
beings – as entrepreneurial selves, striving for self-management and self-reliance. This is why, 
threats are not only thought to be present in violent conflict. Equally, underdevelopment is 
thought to engender alienation, breakdown, and insurgency. The concept of human security is 
often presented as stemming from an increased humanism in international relations, and 
portraying an enlightened way of integrating individual life into international security affairs. The 
concept of human security is thus “liberal [and] people-centred”153. It brings with it a shift in 
moral considerations concerning interstate relations.154  
This shift is perhaps most significantly portrayed in the United Nations R2P Report, 
which was produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS). It was introduced as a response to the horrors of the mass atrocities committed in 
Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, etc., to which the international community failed to 
respond. Criticising this failure to act, it argues for a cosmopolitan responsibility to protect every 
citizen from mass atrocities, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Thus, R2P 
does not merely focus on military intervention. It equally stresses the responsibility to prevent 
violent conflict, and rebuild states, economies and societies in the conflict’s aftermath.155 
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Intervention-measures therefore range from “diplomacy, political sanctions and incentives [to] 
economic sanctions”156, etc. Military force is only to be used as a last resort.157 
According to Mark Duffield and David Chandler, there are several problems with this 
report. First and foremost, the security at stake in the concepts of human security and R2P is not 
that of the societies intervened in, but that of the West. America, the U.S. National Security 
Strategy wrote in 2002, is no longer threatened by conquest, but by states ‘failing’ into chaos and 
vicious cycles of religious violence. Second, the R2P report aims at a discursive shift in the 
international debate on intervention. The term humanitarian intervention is dropped in favour of 
the words responsibility and protection, which positively connote the use of force with its focus 
on the safety of the individual. Sovereignty is reframed as the responsibility a state has to protect 
its citizens. Last, R2P is presented as compatible with the UN, because an intervention based on 
an ethically sound analysis is not deprived of this morality only because an intervening power 
acts unilaterally.158  
The discursive shift is problematic, since it presents the interventionist use of force as 
morally good, and places the burden of justification regarding human rights’ abuses on the state 
suspected of neglecting its responsibility to protect its citizens. Consequently, the moral 
inhibition for Western powers to intervene is at its lowest point since the end of colonisation. 
This suggests that morality and power do not exclude each other, as powerful actors of the 
international arena, such as the UN, the US or NATO actively steer the construction of what is 
considered morally right.159 Further, in the context of the R2P debate, morality works to the 
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advantage of those with power, as the intervening states are often immune to the accountability 
they demand from countries (in danger of) failing. Yet, power does not end here. Once an 
intervention is requested, it reaches all the way to planning and implementing projects meant to 
protect, prevent, or rebuild.160  
 
2.2.2.3  A Word on Planning161 
 
Most literature on planning is found within the development discourse. The origins of planning 
theory, however, lie in the post-World War II euphoria of Western countries. There, the planning 
of cities, regions and nations was to be based on a scientific, value-free and rational basis, with 
the ambition to support the modernisation of both economy and politics. Cultural particularities 
were considered irrelevant. With the beginning of de-colonisation, this style of planning was 
taken over by both the British and French ex-colonies, with the same ambition to modernise. 
However, after having been met with increased criticism, the golden years of planning ended in 
1968. Planners, it was argued by their critics, were too “technocratic, elitist, centralised, 
bureaucratic, pseudoscientific, hegemonic”162 etc. With its top-down and state-centred approach, 
planning was too “inflexible, unresponsive to the needs of the people and alien to local 
culture”163. It thus hindered social change. Therefore, a new approach was called for that 
favoured bottom-up and people-centred projects. The goal was to enhance the participation of the 
local population, to respect the local culture and the needs of disadvantaged or marginalised 
groups, and to become less technocratic and modern-technology oriented.164 
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However, as Heiko Henkel and Roderick L. Stirrat argue, increased participation of the 
local population into the process of planning does not often lead to empowerment. Present 
structures of domination and power are still reproduced, even in bottom-up planning strategies. 
There are two reasons for this reproduction of power. First, by placing the marginalised, 
neglected, poor, etc. in the centre, structures of domination are neutralised, while binary 
opposites such as rich/poor, powerful/powerless, male/female and so forth are perpetuated. 
Second, empowerment is still framed in terms of the liberal project. What the participatory 
subject is to be empowered for, is the ability to partake in the  
great project of the modern as citizens of the institutions of the modern state; as consumers in the 
increasingly global market; as responsible patients in the health system; as rational farmers increasing 
GNP; as participants in the labour market and so on165. 
Henkel and Stirrat conclude that the currency “in which […] power is given, is that of the project 
of modernity”166.167 
Not only that, Jonathan Crush argues that the language of development also incorporates 
the style used by colonising powers. Just like the project of making Africa civilised by forcefully 
rewriting it into a “civilised, ordered, white, male English landscape”168, development holds the 
power to change old worlds and invent new ones. Its jargon thus depends very much on a 
specific style – for example that of expertise, crisis, disintegration, etc. –, used to promote, 
licence or justify some interventionist practices while discrediting others. The jargon of 
development, Crush concludes, speaks in the language of power. Power decides, which 
knowledge is to matter in development planning. Just as all Western words are situated in an 
imperial world, in which the West still “shows the rest of the world the image of its won 
future”169.170 
To take Sri Lanka as an example: On 26 December 2004, the day the tsunami hit, the 
town of Batticola were involved in an active network of women who were facing the on-going 
civil war by engaging in both rehabilitation and reconciliation. After the tsunami, this network 
was restructured in order to address the immediate needs of tsunami-affected families and 
communities. It organised food-distribution, or assisted widowers who had children, but little 
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knowledge as to how to care for them. This changed the day international relief workers arrived. 
Local initiatives were disregarded and pushed aside. As a local NGO worker expressed it, the 
international aid workers were “ex-military and things, and they came with a very rigid agenda, 
based on administrative elements, toolkits and logistics and their ability to get on the ground 
quickly and go”171. Western expertise, Kristin S. Scharffscher argues, was glorified, while 
community representatives lost access to humanitarian information. Without much ado, the local 
network distanced itself from the international intervention, and two worlds emerged. Though 
the local network of women still existed in 2008, it was weakened and not strengthened by the 
international relief operation.172 
A similar example is found in the first DDR programme in Afghanistan, which took place 
in the period 2003-2005. As said, the UN-led DDR programs have gained widespread acceptance 
as a component of post-conflict peacebuilding. Its main goal lies in the reintroduction of former 
combatants into civilian life, through which armed groups are to be dismantled and war is to be 
prevented from reoccurring. This process, Robert Muggah argues, usually does not happen by 
itself, but is part of an attempt to secure the “legitimate control of force from above”173. In 
Afghanistan, the DDR program was part of an integrated peace mission. Perhaps this initial 
position aggravated the implementation of the program. Due to the unwelcome Taliban rule, 
Afghanistan was declared a failed state. The Taliban were not recognised as legitimate conflict 
party, and their collapse was declared as year zero, starting from which the society, politics and 
economy of the country could be built anew.174 In this context, the first DDR program in 
Afghanistan was intended to promote the “surrender of weapons, sever links between AMF175 
commanders and combatants, and reintegrate ex-fighters into meaningful employment or a 
newly reconstituted security sector”176. The program was limited to the Taliban-opposed 
Northern Alliance and held special offers for local commanders who could legalise their de facto 
power by being integrated into the military or by attaining government positions. In all three 
aspects of the program – that is, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – problems were 
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found. Yet, according to Antonio Giustozzi, the main failure of the program lies in the 
insufficient evaluation of both the former combatants themselves and their social and economic 
background. Working with a standardised profile, combatants were thought of as young, 
uprooted, unemployed and frustrated males, ignoring the fact that many of them had never left 
their home, and sometimes even worked part-time despite their fighting activities. The problem 
of lacking a sound assessment also concerned the mafia-dominated realities of the Afghan 
market, and the need for social – and not merely economic – security. As a result, many of the 
former combatants could never really cut their ties from the military units controlled by warlords 
and local commanders.177  
 
 
2.2.3  A First Conclusion: Giving Voice to the Local-Local 
 
The liberal peace, Richmond thus concludes, “has become an intervention in local discussions 
about peace, often replacing them entirely”178. It privileges the Western way of thinking about 
and making of peace, which is, then, presented as objective and universal. However, as the case 
of Afghanistan illustrates, this highly standardised approach to peacebuilding often does not 
match the realities on the ground. It is, as said, like a ‘peace from IKEA’, in which the desired 
state of affairs can be assembled the same way no matter which context it is to be brought to. 
Problematically, too, the structural design for peace comes from a position of power. Only 
certain – third – parties are in the position to know, define and export peace to the ignorant who 
still live in a state of war. “Both acts of defining and constructing peace”, Richmond concludes, 
“are therefore hegemonic acts”179. Concealed behind the rhetoric of economic prosperity, 
morality, and right, they create “subtle forms of colonisation, interventionism and local 
depoliticisation”180. It acts in the service of those in power, and simultaneously recreates 
orientalist notions such as ‘us and them’ or the other as past enemy and future ideal.181 
Importantly, as has been shown above, the hegemonic, imperial or even colonial trend, of 
the liberal peace is not a result of a deformation of the otherwise pure and morally good liberal 
condition. It springs right from the liberal core, as the latter strives for the perpetuation of its 
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economic wealth and political power. According to Richmond, the international community is 
not only complicit in the problem of starvation, but also perpetuates the current state of peace, 
and especially war. Again, I want to stress that “few peacebuilders are cynics and few would see 
themselves as representatives […] of an imperial power”182.183 However, being agents within the 
current international system, the peace peacebuilders strive for, cannot take hold on the ground. It 
remains, Richmond argues, superficial; a phantasm that is planted into a “soil without water, 
dependent on foreign resources and subject to uncertainty about the longevity of external 
commitment”184. The peace built, remains virtual, and by declaring itself as virtuous, by 
attempting to spread the light of peace, it equally feeds the shades of war. Liberal peace, 
Richmond argues, always carries a trace of violence, just as violence always holds a seed of 
peace. Hence, “as peace spreads, it collapses. Peace becomes war and war becomes peace”185.186 
There is, Richmond writes, only one way out of this problem. It leads to the deeper-than-
local, to the “local-local”187. There, peacebuilders can learn to give voice to the other. They can 
learn to care for and relate to the recipients of peacebuilding on an everyday level, where human 
beings meet each other as human beings. Empathy, respect, and recognition mark this new 
approach, and space is to be given to local ownership, self-government, and self-determination. 
Yet, Richmond does not fully break with the liberal tradition. He proposes a “liberal-local 
hybrid”188 between the liberal peacebuilders and the recipient individuals, communities or social 
movements. This hybrid is to lead toward a post-liberal peace characterised by reconciliation, 
which takes into account the importance of the everyday.189 
However, this “knowledge of the local”190 is not a recently discovered focus. As was 
shown in the chapter on planning, local emancipation and empowerment in the form of bottom-
up planning has been discussed ever since the 1970s. Nevertheless, peacebuilding practices have 
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not been able to escape their own problematic history. In fact, it could be asked whether this new 
focus on the local-local – the ‘real’ local, so to speak – is not partaking in the construction of a 
new category, under which the people affected by violent conflict are, once again, placed by 
someone else. As Hirblinger and Simons note, the “local is nothing out there but is partly 
constituted as an object of knowledge”191, which homogenizes and essentialises highly complex 
and dynamic social environments. Further, the category of the true local is by no means value-
free. Rather, it functions as selective aid in distinguishing the ‘good local’ – because true – from 
the ‘bad local’ already infiltrated by liberal practices. In other words, the notion of the ‘local-
local’ produces yet another binary distinction between the pure and authentic, indigenous local, 
and the dominating, Western liberal. The latest critique on the liberal peace fails in its chance to 
reintroduce a long lost common ground: our humanity.192 Therefore, it is questionable weather a 
post-liberal, liberal-local hybrid will succeed in evading the present structure of power, 
domination, imperialism and at times neo-colonialism. As Richmond asked two years before he 
introduced his ideas on a post-liberal peace, “[h]ow does one emancipate without dominating, 
without ignoring difference, without knowing the mind of the other?”193 
How, indeed? There is a voice that might have an answer. A voice largely ignored in the 
current discourse on peace. A voice that invites us to go beyond, or before, the original contract, 
through which reason gives power to institutions, before peace is handed over to politics, law, 
and the economy. This voice argues that the history of peace, involving institutions called forth 
merely by truth and reason,  
does not recognise itself in the millennia of fratricidal, political and bloody struggles of imperialism, of 
human hatred and exploitation, up to our century of world wars, genocide, the Holocaust, and terrorism; 
of unemployment, the continuing poverty of the Third world, of the pitiless doctrines and cruelties of 
fascism and National Socialism, up to the supreme paradox where the defence of the human and its 
rights is inverted into Stalinism.194 
The liberal peace is blind to its own violent ways and detours, as it has forgotten something 
essential: before the world can be possessed, before it can be understood and judged, it is given. 
Before becoming an issue of politics, law or the economy, peace is found in touch, in proximity, 
in the neighbour, and the responsibility I have for him. It is peace that makes the world arise, and 
meaning unfold. According to this voice, the voice of Lévinas, peace will thus not be found by 
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critically reflecting on the failure of our powers of knowledge, hoping to ever improve political 
and institutional approaches to a peaceful society. On the contrary, Lévinas invites or rather 
forces us to a form of criticism invoked by guilt with regards to the very basic assumptions we 
hold, about what it means to live in this world as a human being or, more exactly, as a subject. 
Only within this latter critique can one gain a sense of what peace really is – just to then lose it 
again as soon as it enters the realm of our understanding. Lévinas calls for a critical movement 
leading us beyond our very condition, to where the possibility of knowledge arises.195 It is to 
Lévinas, and the answer he received from Derrida, I shall now turn.  
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3  Lévinas and Derrida – Irreducible Relations and Open Roads 
 
“God is therefore implicated in war.”196 This sentence is perhaps the ‘peaking nexus’ at which the 
philosophical approaches of Lévinas and Derrida meet. Ultimately, their dialogue oscillates 
between a desire for purity, and a pragmatic acknowledgement that such purity might never be 
reached. What does this mean, then, when it comes to peace? In the present chapter, this question 
shall lead me, first, through the thought of Lévinas, and, second, through that of Derrida, so as to 
finally end in a critical approximation of the two. 
 
3.1  Lévinas – A Peace Beyond the I 
 
But over the hands that have touched things, places, 
trampled by beings, the things, the context in which 
those fragments enter, the inflexions of the voice and 
the words that are articulated in them, the ever 
sensible signs of language, the letters traced, the 
vestiges, the relics – over all things, beginning with 
the human face and skin, tenderness spreads.197  
 
Body before reason, sense and experience before thought, touch before sight, language as speech 
before language as thought, ethics before truth, and the Other before the Same198: this is Lévinas’ 
legacy to Western thought. A legacy that, “[l]ike a battering-ram”199, attempts to break through 
Western tradition’s very core by initiating a fundamental re-evaluation of concepts such as truth, 
thought, reason, knowledge,200 language, the subject and its freedom, etc. Yet, Lévinas’ concern 
does not merely reside in epistemological matters. In connection with epistemology, he equally 
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asks for a new understanding of the social, and the institutions necessary to organise society in a 
peaceful manner. According to Lévinas, peace is not about my having a comfortable life. As long 
as there is an Other who is potentially exposed to suffering, there is no home for me in this world. 
Without return, I am for the Other. Forgetting this means being blind to the origin of the world, as 
we see it. It is, Lévinas argues, equivalent to giving in to violence, egoism, and imperialism. In 
the following three subchapters I will trace Lévinas’ argument by introducing, first, his criticism 
of Western philosophy; second, the ensuing inversion – or “displacement”201 – of its classical 
binary concepts; and third, my being ordered to infinite responsibility by the Other as a 
consequence of this inversion. 
 
 
3.1.1  The Violence of Universality 
 
Ever since Aristotle, Lévinas argues, occidental philosophy has founded itself within Being. 
Ontology was regarded as the first philosophy.202 With its focus on Being and beings, it favours 
an approach to knowledge and theory that mediates understanding via a third, general, and hence 
neutral term – be it a concept, a sensation, or Being itself. This term identifies particular beings 
and unifies diversity. The problem here is that the term used is taken from within the Same. By 
being understood, a particular singular being is hence submitted to the Same. It loses its 
otherness, and thus its singularity. This is not to be thought of as some deliberate, vicious act of 
domination. It is merely the basic form of judgement in which something particular is placed 
under a more general term, in order to capture its essential character. 203 
Said otherwise, when I relate to the world, things appear to me. Yet this is already a 
working of my mind, which judges that which appears to me as being something, a thing. My 
mind unifies a certain whooshing sound, the colours green and brown, a roughness on my hand, 
etc. under a concept: tree. It also understands a tightening sensation in my chest, heat, a pounding 
heart, breathlessness, etc. as belonging to a given feeling: fear. The things that appear – my 
experiences – are taken to make sense within a net of meaning thrown onto the world by none 
other than myself. I do not perceive the world, I do not experience it; I understand it. “Being is 
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manifested with a theme.”204 In its arising it is already always understood as something. In fact, it 
arises because it is understood. By being thematised, Lévinas argues, Being – the world, as we 
see it – is created. “Ontology as first philosophy”205, is an egology. The things that arise have to 
adapt to me.206  
This scenario grants reason the privilege of being primary to all else. In its light things 
appear as if without origin, as if their origin lay in reason itself. Consequently, objectivity – the 
subsumption of diversity under a general concept provided by the Same – seems necessary in 
order for the subject to be able to relate to another being. Relation comes second to judgement. 
With regards to things, this has, as mentioned, the effect of assimilating something other to the 
Same. In the context of a relation with another human being, however, the priority of reason 
degrades communication to a mere effect of thought, to a “subsidiary function”207 of the judging 
mind. Understood this way, language does not gain its meaning from speech, from the fact that 
something is said to someone. Rather, language “belongs to the very work of truth”208. It is 
“kerygmatic”209. The world is first proclaimed by me; and by being so it is taken.210 
As a consequence, freedom is being understood as the subject’s being in a world without 
obstacles. In the realm of Being, the understanding subject is free. There is no otherness to stand 
in its way, nothing that cannot be grasped, and no place on Earth that withstands assimilation. 
Such and interpretation of freedom, Lévinas argues, serves to secure a “permanence in the 
[S]ame”211. He writes, 
That reason in the last analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralizing the other and 
encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid down that sovereign reason knows 
only itself, that nothing other limits it. The neutralization of the other who becomes a theme or an 
object – appearing, that is, taking its place in the light – is precisely his reduction to the [S]ame. To 
know ontologically is to surprise in an existent [i.e. a particular being] […] that by which it is not 
this existent, this stranger, that by which it is somehow betrayed, surrenders, is given in the 
horizon in which it loses itself and appears, lays itself open to grasp, becomes a concept212.213 
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In sum, declaring ontology as first philosophy takes the most fundamental mode of being in the 
world to be the one that secures the primacy of the Same. Its heirs are the Greek, and, like in the 
tale of Odysseus, it always allows the Same to return home. As can be seen in the quote above, 
this ‘permanence in the same’ is upheld by an alliance between the Same and some sort of 
totality, which gathers singularities under a more general term.214  
This alliance has a purpose. By taking Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as an example, 
Lévinas describes true knowledge as concerned with the original presence of beings. A presence 
that is thought to be found either in their “identity as beings”215, or in their Being. In this 
difference with regards to the original presence of beings, however, lies a deep unease that 
follows philosophy almost from its very beginning. It signifies that, by becoming phenomena – 
by appearing in the frame of a theme – beings might arise separately from their Being, and reason 
might thus not reach that which actually exists outside itself. There is a danger that Being as such 
is never reached. Misapprehension – the failure to grasp another being – is thus a constant threat 
of rationality.216  
To find ease in spite of this threat, and to legitimise rationality, despite its failures and its 
relativity, occidental philosophy had to come up with something greater than the subjective mind: 
a reason not bound to a particular person. Hegel called it ‘impersonal reason’. Impersonal insofar 
as personhood was only gained by an individual who let her reason become universal. Within 
such an approach, individual thought does not matter. Everything converges to become part of 
one single totality. This manifests itself materially in one objective historical stream, in which the 
individual is known only externally, by the dates of its birth and death. Individual freedom is then 
only a “reflection of an universal order which maintains itself and justifies itself all by itself”217. 
Reference to impersonal reason, Lévinas argues, is always given when the Same does not hold its 
ground vis-à-vis another being. When confronted with its own failure, reason flees to the totality 
of a higher generality, which substitutes “ideas for persons […] [and] [e]xistents are reduced to 
the neuter state of the idea, Being, the concept”218. Lévinas thus suggests that, even if the 
universality of impersonal reason subsumes individuality, it is still working to the advantage of 
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the Same, as it follows the latter’s movement of finding legitimation via a generalising totality.219  
It is the alliance with the universal that introduces the problem of violence into the realm 
of the Same. Violence, Lévinas writes, is  
any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act; as if the rest of the universe were there only 
to receive the action; violence is consequently also any action which we endure without at every point 
collaborating in it220.  
The first part of Lévinas’ definition refers to the violent working of a subjective mind not yet 
aware of its own limitations. This mind is acting ‘as if it were alone’, by using its light to grasp, 
assimilate and possess things. The first part of the definition addresses my violence toward other 
beings. It thus seems only logical and fair to equally condemn as violent any harm done to me. 
Yet, to Lévinas, the primary problem of my violation does not lie in the limitation of my latitude 
through another singular being. By adding the second part of the definition, Lévinas does not 
intend to leave or somehow modify the dominion of the Same. He wants to stress the danger of 
any order in which the individual is counted less than the totality by which it is held – even 
though this order was instituted so as to secure ‘permanence in the Same’. This is the case, when 
personhood is gained only in reference to universal reason; when an individual life is only 
considered of importance due to the fact that it takes part in the objective stream of history; and 
when individuality is subjected to a social, economic and political order through which individual 
action is steered and controlled.221  
To conclude, violence accompanies both stages of the Same: that of subjective, yet 
uncritical, and that of impersonal reason. It permeates the entire realm of Being, as it is inherently 
part of an approach to the world in which singular beings gain relevance only as part of a higher 
generality. This can be a term; but it can also be the idea of impersonal reason, or the state. 
Hence, it could be said that, to Lévinas, the form of judgement and the order of the state are of 
the same violent structure, which strips individuals of their uniqueness by placing them under a 
greater totality. It is for this reason that he considers the degeneration of political power into 
forms of violence such as National Socialism, Stalinism, or even the starvation of the poor not as 
a radical break with truth and reason, but as their continuation. By approaching the world via the 
structure of totality, the realm of the Same becomes expansionist. It will not stop, as Behnke 
wrote, until all otherness has been made part of the Same; until every thing’s final arrival in one 
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single and universal totality is reached. The realm of the Same is imperialistic. The primacy of 
reason introduces the danger of totalitarianism. “Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of 
power.”222 However, as shall be seen, according to Lévinas, it is also blind.  
 
 
3.1.2  At Home with the Same 
 
Unlike occidental philosophy proclaims, reason is not the primary characteristic of the ‘I’. 
According to Lévinas, I am first of all a body. Being so, I am separate, yet not independent. I 
have needs and live from things that lie outside myself. In this constellation I find pleasure and 
happiness. The fact that I have needs does not refrain me from being my own master and, in fact, 
master over the things from which I live – as, by being consumed, they become part of me. 
Despite my having needs, I am happy. Life is lovable. The misery of poverty and hunger are not 
inherently part of this constellation. They are only so because of a badly organised society.223  
The ability to experience pleasure, Lévinas writes, refers to something that cannot be 
captured by universal history, which only deals with the date of my birth and death as well as my 
output in the time between those two events. This something is the dimension of interiority or 
psychism found in a being that sustains its own existence, and is thus no longer a participant in 
the totality of Being. It is atheist, in the sense that it is not part of God – i.e. of something that is 
infinitely and absolutely one. Separate, it places itself into the world “as the [S]ame and as I”224. 
It is at home. It does not need any justification for its doing. It is spontaneously free. In sum, I do 
not primarily participate in universality. I am not originally reason. As body, I initially break with 
totality and become unique, singular. Yet, by being so, I am lonely and my future is insecure. 
How can I know, whether my needs are going to be fulfilled tomorrow? Pleasure – the fulfilment 
of needs – is not simply given; it has to be worked for. This, Lévinas argues, is done by labour, 
which allows me to transform the world into property and, ultimately, postpone my own death. 
The property gained – that is, the world grasped – I store at my house, which functions as the 
extension of interiority. Thus, the “first movement of economy [in its etymological sense] is […] 
egoist”225.226 
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Nonetheless, this movement as such is not judged negatively by Lévinas, as any will 
could not be constituted without a separate individual concerned about her own survival. Were it 
otherwise, were the will springing forth from an impersonal, universal thinking – that is, from a 
totality comprising Being, and hence unconcerned about its own survival – how would this 
thinking learn to want? Why would it act? Were there no initial corporal separation, which led to 
economy and hence egoism, there would be no possibility of change, becoming, or time. As the 
latter do take place, human reason cannot exist outside a physical body. Without a separate, 
incarnated subject there would be neither the need, nor a search for truth. There would only be 
Being. Truth needs the ‘I’. At the same time my body needs intentionality, in order to plan my 
own sustenance. Therefore, neither the separation of rationality and corporeity nor the 
hierarchical primacy of reason can be justified. Reason, Lévinas concludes, is always incarnated 
and subjective.227 
Moreover, the fact that I am first of all a body implies that I perceive or experience beings 
before understanding them. As described above, understanding something as ‘a tree’ involves 
seeing colours, hearing certain sounds, smelling, touching etc. My senses are directly affected by 
the beings outside myself. It is only when the felt is separated from the feeling via a third general 
term that consciousness arises. Experience thus does not presuppose thought. It is the reverse.228 
By being a body, I am first touched by things. I am close to beings in a way that does not strip 
them of their otherness.229 As Lévinas writes, 
before turning into a cognition of the outsides of things, and during this very cognition, touch is pure 
approach and a proximity that is not reducible to the experience of proximity. […] The visible 
caresses the eye. One sees and one hears like one touches. The proximity of things is poetry; in 
themselves the things are revealed before being approached.230 
The befalling of touch is thus the only possibility for me to be close to other beings, precisely 
because I am separate from them. Touch allows for a relationship in which both I and the other 
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being are left alone. In our relating to one another, we are not placed under a totality that 
comprises and judges the relation we hold. We remain absolute.231 
Yet, there is an anachronism between beings and their being understood, because the 
thought of something is never that particular something. To the latter, the former is always 
already past. Thus, as the fact of being cognised is not actually present in cognition itself, 
insecurity is, again, an inevitable consequence of understanding. By following the structure of 
judgement, the cognition of something as something “does not understand the object, but its 
meaning”232 The origin of phenomena is thus part of another principle than that of the mind. The 
phenomenal world cannot reach its past. Accordingly, I myself can never know whether alleging 
things about the phenomenal world – the world that appears to me – is true or false.233 
Despite being a necessary condition in the search for truth, separation thence also calls 
into life the constant possibility of misapprehension. Descartes’ fear of a “malicious demon”234 
that meddles with the appearing phenomena,235 cannot be escaped, despite the evidence of the 
cogito. To a limited mind – as is the incarnated human mind– scepticism is not a method; it is an 
ever-present, luring threat. The “universality of theoretical reason, which arose early in the 
‘Know thyself’ in order to seek the entire universe in self-consciousness”236 has to be broken 
with. If done so, it might become even clearer that every thought about the world is, in fact, an 
appointing, a proclaiming, and hence a saying it. Cognition at its core is kerygmatic. However, 
thought as kerygma suggests there is someone receiving the kerygmatic proclamation. The saying 
is a presentation of the world, as I see it, to someone else. It is a present, an offering, leaving it up 
to somebody else to decide, or judge, whether my proclamation is a correct representation of the 
world. Anything said about the world thus has to be thought of as question I pose, and which only 
someone other can affirm. The sting of scepticism cannot be taken away but by the Other’s act of 
saying yes to the world presented. Truth does not commence in thought. It begins in the spoken 
word.237 
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Prior to all “understanding or misunderstanding” 238  there is speech, language as 
communication, in which two absolute beings – in the sense that they are not participating “in a 
transparent universality”239 – share their view on the world without knowing each other’s 
thoughts. Truth does not lie dormant, only to be awaken by a subjective mind’s elevation to 
universality. It is a bargain between the Other and me. The relation from which it springs is not 
participative but plural. It is a face-to-face encounter in which both interlocutors retain their 
freedom to answer in an unexpected way. Rather than being impersonal, thinking is essentially 
interpersonal. It is a social incident, and evolves where two singularities are in touch.240 “[T]he 
locus of truth”, Lévinas thus concludes, “is society”241.242 Universality, in this case does not 
support my “joyous possession of the world” 243 . Rather, objectivity – as interpersonally 
bargained truth – is gained by giving, which is to say by the abolishment of private property. 
 
 
3.1.3  My Life for the Other 
 
The Other is of course also placed in a particular social or cultural context. He does have a role 
that can be conceived. Perhaps the Other is the postman delivering my mail, a nanny, a teacher, a 
bank robber, a warlord, etc. Yet, within and in spite of this context, the Other is close to me 
because we say things to each other, regardless of what is being said. In proximity, the Other is 
immediately present, without the need for me to give meaning to him.244 Consequently, he does 
not take a place within Being. By speaking, he represents (by) himself. He shows his face and 
thus offers a glimpse of what he is behind his role and outside the realm of the Same. On a far 
deeper level than confirming the correctness of a specific signifier, the face of the Other hence 
affirms significance as such, and with it he breaks the disquiet of solipsism.245  
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However, because the Other has a meaning of his own, I can never actually grasp who he 
is. To my mind, he is always already gone. This is why Lévinas writes that the time of the Other 
is that of an absolutely irrevocable past. If he appears, he does so to disappear, to only leave a 
trace. There is a mystery connected to him that I will never understand. He seems to come from 
beyond this world of Being, from a realm over which I have no control. Suddenly, I find my 
powers of accession put into question. This is quite a radical and Earth-shaking experience for 
me. I am overwhelmed. At the same time, longing spreads within me. I desire to know, who this 
being is. This desire is unlike any needs I have ever known. Needs, I have always been able to 
fulfil. Yet, the desire for the Other is something I am unable to control, and which grows each 
time I am touched by the Other’s presence. Thus, just as there is a temporal anachronism between 
the Other and me, there is also a spatial asymmetry. The Other, evading, if not questioning, my 
powers of comprehension, seems to come from above. He is His Holiness, the most high.246 
It is important to understand, that for me, as a subject, this meeting with the Other takes 
place outside any “noetico-noematic structure”247. I cannot make sense of it, as I can never leave 
my place and look at our relation from outside of it. Yet, of course there is also a theoretical 
explanation to this intrusion of the Other that I cannot withstand. Even though the face of the 
Other evokes within me an idea of who he might be, this idea can never do him justice. He 
always exceeds “the idea of the other in me”248. To Lévinas, this is exactly what Descartes 
describes as the ‘idea of infinity’.249 This idea can never hold infinity as such. Having the idea of 
infinity is thus like walking toward the infinite, without ever arriving at the desired destination. 
Thinking the infinite is infinition – the evolving of infinity. The desire directed toward the Other 
takes on the same structure. What is more, according to Lévinas, I desire the Other because he is 
the only possibility for me to be in touch with what lies beyond Being: the infinite.250 
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In short, when the Other shows himself in the phenomenal world, I am touched by his 
face in a particular way. On the one hand, the face of the Other ends the loneliness of inner 
thought and relieves me from solipsism. On the other hand, the face of the Other forces me to see 
my own limitations with regards to proclaiming – that is, naming, and thus identifying and 
possessing – the world. Faced with the Other, I find myself in a situation in which the only way I 
can retain my untroubled freedom would be to kill him. Accordingly, my attempts at grasping the 
world are not only unmasked as being false: they are accused of being violent, and my freedom 
of being deadly. By presenting himself, the Other questions both accuracy and legitimacy – both 
consciousness and conscience – of the hegemonic ‘permanence in the Same’. Meeting the Other, 
my subjectivity is transformed. I am no longer subjecting, naming or nominative, but subjected, 
accused or accusative – even in grammatical terms: the face of the Other concerns me.251 
Simultaneously, the face of the Other reminds me of the utmost vulnerability of human 
existence and the hazards he faces. His face speaks of peril and direst need. Thus, while the Other 
questions my untroubled freedom, he also begs for my goodness. The face of the Other is both 
height and nudity, divinity and utmost helplessness. Due to this constellation, the Other demands 
my response, without my response ever being able to take the form of murder. As the Other’s 
plea reaches me from beyond Being, and hence lies before understanding or intention, goodness 
is evoked within me long before it is my turn to choose.252 At the same time, I am not left without 
any possibility for action – as the placement of my subjectivity under the accusative case might 
negatively suggest. When I see the perils of the Other, I am ordered to a responsibility that no one 
else can share. That is, instead of taking my freedom away, the Other redirects it. Likewise, my 
subjectivity is transformed into the wish to never cease to try to ease the suffering of the Other. A 
life in service of the Other, without hoping to be ever compensated for any commitment or 
dedication, not even in some kind of afterlife: this is the positive form, subjectivity takes in the 
face of the Other. The Other is thus the source, from which meaning is not only given to himself, 
or the world, but also to me and my life as “to-be-for-after-my-death”253. This, Lévinas argues, is 
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not the story of Odysseus and his long journey home, but of Abraham, who left his home to never 
return. It is not something taught by the Greek, but by the Jewish.254  
This has great significance, as it implies that proximity beyond thought, and not reason, 
carries within it the seed for goodness. In fact, it is this constellation of my responsibility for the 
Other that plants the seed for thought and reason by saying the “first word”255. As Lévinas writes, 
Before the hunger of men responsibility is measured only ‘objectively’; it is irrecusable. The face 
opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation, which no ‘interiority’ permits 
avoiding.256 
Declaring ontology as first philosophy disregards the fact that without this ethical relation 
between the Other and me, research of Being would not be possible. Prior to ontology, Lévinas 
concludes, there is ethics. The original state of man is peace, not war.257 
 
 
3.1.4  “Peace, Love and Understanding”258 
 
Lévinas’ critique of occidental philosophy is thus quite radical. Not only does it suggest an 
inversion of all the central binary concepts of occidental philosophy, such as reason vs. body, 
sense vs. cognition, language vs. thought, ethics vs. truth, etc.; it equally argues that the 
philosophical tradition of the West has chosen violence to be the original state of humankind, by 
setting ontology as first philosophy. War of all against all is only the logical consequence of a 
state in which a multiplicity of beings are concerned about their own existence – or ‘permanence 
in the [S]ame’ – and therefore rival each other over a way to control the present, in order to 
survive. These beings, then, have to be bestowed with reason. They have to be given the 
capability to transform this rivalry by establishing something greater and more general than 
themselves – such as the order of the state. In consequence, the peace introduced by the original 
contract aims at tranquillity and order and assigns every individual its present place. War is no 
longer needed. Yet, this peace has its origin in truth, not ethics. It follows the logic of the Same. 
Unsurprisingly, justice is created to ensure my freedom and to protect my property. The state 
                                                
254 See: Lévinas, 1969, pp.72-77, 84-90, 178 & 197-201; Lévinas, 1986, p. 348 
255 Lévinas, 1969, p. 42 
256 Lévinas, 1969, p. 201 
257 Lévinas, 1969, pp. 179-201 




called forth by the social contract still entails “calculation, mediation and politics”259. The 
peaceful benefits of trade and exchange advertised are merely a continuation of the original state 
of war. Even in a state of peaceful trade, human “beings remain always assembled, present”260, 
patiently awaiting future benefit and victory. Because self-interests prevail, this peace is unstable. 
Likewise, the peace created by the unifying power of impersonal reason is alienated, as it places 
each individual under a totality that inhibits both becoming and difference. The state “awakens 
the person to a freedom it immediately violates”261. In sum, the rational peace of the bourgeois 
exhibits both egoist and totalising violence. It is a peace of empires, fighting for the Same “on the 
basis of the Truth”262.263 
This shakes Western thinking about peace in its foundations. Lévinas does not merely 
argue that reason is unable to secure peace in a sustainable manner; he equally accuses rational 
peace of playing its part in horrors usually dismissed as irrational, and hence alien to the 
progressing track of truth and peace. Accordingly, violent developments such as fascism or 
genocide might not actually be the expression of a reason turned insane, but the result of an 
attempt to do everything needed in order for the ‘permanence in the [S]ame’ to be secured. 
Violence – especially on a political or social level – occurs in a world that worships the ‘I’ and 
has forgotten the Other. It occurs in a world turned blind to its origin. 
Lévinas contrasts this scenario of a rational peace sliding back into violence, with a peace 
placed at the heart of a relationship that makes murder impossible, and from which truth has yet 
to be born. To him, peace has to “respond to a call more urgent than that of truth and initially 
distinct from the call of truth”264. Peace is the foreword to truth. It is the “surplus of sociality”265 
that leaves otherness absolute, and the Other close to me in a neighbourly way. Still, the relation 
between me and the Other does not call for a political peace, but for an ethical one. With the face 
of the Other presenting itself in its utmost vulnerability and need – that is, basically in its 
mortality – I am forced to wake up from my egoistic and lonely slumber in order to keep watch 
over and ease the precarious situation of this other being. Peace, as seen by Lévinas, is performed 
by me, when I infinitely take my place as substitute for the Other’s suffering. It is “the whole 
                                                
259 Lévinas, 1981, p. 4 
260 Lévinas, 1981, p. 5 
261 Lévinas, 1969, p. 176 
262 Lévinas, 1996, p. 162 
263 See: Lévinas, 1969, pp. 22, 45-47 &76; Lévinas, 1981, pp. 4-5 
264 Lévinas, 1996, p. 165 
265 Lévinas, 1996, p. 165 
51 
 
gravity”266 of goodness, and my undeniable and unavoidable responsibility not to leave the “other 
alone faced with the mystery of death”267.268 Peace, Lévinas writes, can therefore 
not be identified with the end of combats that cease for want of combatants, by the defeat of some and 
the victory of the others, that is ,with cemeteries or future universal empires. Peace must be my peace, 
in a relation that starts from an I and goes to the other, in desire and goodness, where the I both 
maintains itself and exists without egoism.269 
Reason, judgement and truth only become necessary in the face of a third party. The third party 
interrupts and confuses my relation to and responsibility for the Other. Suddenly, I find myself 
infinitely responsible for two people. As this is an impossible task – there is no such thing as two 
infinite responsibilities – I become torn. Which of the two is in more need? What if one poses a 
threat to the other? I start to ask questions, and thus to weigh and make equal two fates which in 
reality are incomparable. Importantly, Lévinas thus argues that judgement is needed solely 
because of my failure to take on an infinite responsibility for more than one person at the same 
time. “[T]he first question in the interhuman,” Lévinas concludes, “is the question of justice”270. 
Only then do consciousness, reason, and knowledge arise. Likewise, the call for political and 
legal institutions is merely raised due to the multiplicity of human beings in danger, and not in 
order to secure my protection or to safeguard my possessions.271  
This is often forgotten. Being and rationality have a way of cutting the ties to their origin, 
making believe that they are the sole initiators of meaning, and consequently the only hope for 
justice and peace. As seen above, this is not so. The bourgeois peace has to be thought of in 
relation to a peace much older than reason. As Lévinas writes, if  
reason lives in language, if the first rationality gleams forth in the opposition of the face to face, if the 
first intelligible, the first signification, is the infinity of the intelligence that presents itself (that is, 
speaks to me) in the face, if reason is defined by signification rather than signification being defined 
by the impersonal structures of reason, if society precedes the apparition of these impersonal 
structures, if universality reigns as the presence of humanity in the eyes that look at me, if, finally, we 
recall that this look appeals to my responsibility and consecrates my freedom as responsibility and gift 
of self – then the pluralism of society could not disappear in the elevation to reason, but would be its 
condition. It is not the impersonal in me that Reason would establish, but an I myself capable of 
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society, an I that has arisen in enjoyment as separated, but whose separation would itself be necessary 
for infinity to be – for its infinitude is accomplished as the ‘facing.’272 
Pluralism – that is, separate individuals actively participating in the structuring of their social 
constellation –, not unity, would have to be the objective of politics. Only this way, can the Other 
be protected and the violence springing from the unifying power of judgement be minimised. 
Equally, there needs to be a constant reminder as to where truth, politics and the law were 
instituted from. Within this world of Being a wakefulness is needed, in order to never forget that 
it is the “ethical order of human proximity that gives rise to the order of objectivity, truth and 
knowledge”273, and that political and legal institutions are hence primarily there to protect the 
lives of others, and not my own.274 Otherwise, the hegemonic path of the Same, with all its 
consequences, cannot be evaded. To remind of and remain awake for the Other within the work 
of truth, to be the wisdom of goodness and performed responsibility, and to keep watch over a 
social state of giving and pluralism: this, Lévinas concludes, is the task of philosophy.275 Yet, can 
philosophy fulfil this task? 
 
3.2  Derrida – The Madness of Peace 
 
For me, it is always a question of differential force, 
of difference as difference of force, of force as 
différance (différance is a force différée-différante), 
of the relation between force and form, force and 
signification, performative force, illocutionariy or 
prelocutionary force, of persuasive and rhetorical 
force, of affirmation by signature, but also and 
especially of all the paradoxical situations in which 
the greatest force and the greatest weakness strangely 
enough exchange places. And that is the whole 
history.276 
 
Philosophical discourse, Derrida agrees with Lévinas, does primarily move within a thought that 
is shaped by the Greek. It “would not be possible to philosophize, or to speak philosophically, 
outside this [the Greek] medium”277. Husserl and Martin Heidegger knew of this. Yet, any 
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attempt at approaching their dialogue still has to take place within Greek language and tradition. 
As Derrida writes, 
At the moment when the fundamental conceptual system produced by the Greco-European 
adventure is in the process of taking over all of humanity, […] [n]o philosophy could possibly 
dislodge […] [it] without first succumbing to […] [it], or without finally destroying itself as a 
philosophical language.278 
This Greek foundation is the stronghold of philosophical thought, the knowledge of which keeps 
the adventure of philosophy safe – even its plunging into the distress of scepticism, for example. 
This “knowledge and safety […] are […] not in the world: rather, they are the possibility of our 
language and the nexus of our world”279. Lévinas’ thought attempts to shake the heart of this 
safe-house. From the beginning of his text Violence and Metaphysics Derrida thus grants Lévinas 
the ability to “make us tremble”280 at the very foundation of the Greek logos and to “summon us 
to depart from the Greek site […] to move […] toward an exhalation, toward a prophetic 
speech”281. At the same time, and also from the very beginning Derrida points toward the danger 
of a project that needs to make use of the language it seeks to destroy in the process of destroying 
it. How can the metaphor of light – and, with it, the primacy and violence of the Same – be 
broken with in philosophical discourse if “all languages combat within it, modifying only the 
same metaphor and choosing the best light”282?283 
The main problem, to Derrida, lies in the fact that Lévinas still remains tied to one central 
positive discrimination of the Greek/Western Tradition: logocentrism, and its favouring phonetics 
over scripture. Lévinas merely differentiates between language as thought and language as 
speech. He does not ask what could be learned from its written form. Derrida, like Lévinas, is 
sceptical about the importance reason and rationality have gained within Western philosophy. 
Like Lévinas, he advances his criticism by dismantling long-held assumptions about certain 
primacies, all of which he regards as being part of a “metaphysics of the presence”284. 
Nevertheless, Derrida and Lévinas do not altogether walk the same path. In fact, by attacking yet 
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another unquestioned primacy – that of phonetics, and everything linked to it – Derrida seems to 
go further than Lévinas. As we shall see, this difference of view has fundamental implications for 
the dialogue between them. This becomes perhaps most poignant in Derrida’s text Violence and 
Metaphysics, which can be considered an answer to Lévinas’ early thought peaking in the his 
work Totality and Infinity. 
In this chapter I will consider Derrida’s critique of Lévinas, as well as the consequent 
rehabilitation of Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s Ontology. However, in order to 
understand better the depth and border, in and at which Lévinas and Derrida meet in their 
dialogue, I shall first introduce one of Derrida’s most important offerings to philosophy: 
différance. Last, I will try to frame Derrida’s thinking on peace as a movement between 
pragmatism and madness, at the very border of sense and impossibility. 
 
 
3.2.1  This Différence with an A285 
 
To approach Derrida, I shall begin with a letter: a. With this letter, which Derrida infixes into the 
word différence – so that it becomes différance – he already announces several of his major 
concerns, above all of which stands the re-establishment of writing over phonetics. The 
difference between différence and différance cannot be heard. It can only be read and written. 
Therefore, any treatise on différance necessarily needs to take a “passage through a written 
text”286. Writing is therefore not a pure translation of phonetics. Rather, for phonetics to be 
comprehensible, it has to make use of the written system of ‘signs’, including a whole array of 
non-phonetic ‘signs’, such as space, comma, dot, question or exclamation mark, colon, 
semicolon, etc. Thus, Derrida puts quotation marks around the word ‘sign’, as he actually thinks 
it unfit. A sign is usually thought of as present in itself, and signifying by itself. However, both 
phonetic and non-phonetic ‘signs’ merely make sense if brought forth in difference to one 
another. This difference is not visible, nor is it comprehensible. Visibility and intelligibility – or 
more abstractly, the presence of a sign – are mere products of this difference. By insinuating the 
letter a into the word différence Derrida thus wants to address an order beyond “one of the 
founding oppositions of philosophy”287, differentiating between the sensible and the intelligible. 
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In writing, this opposition dissolves. By starting with the letter a, Derrida at once moves to the 
heart of the matter, 
The order which resists this opposition [visible vs. intelligible], and resists it because it transports it, is 
announced in a movement of différance […] between two differences or two letters, a différance 
which belongs neither to the voice nor to writing in the usual sense, and which is located […] between 
speech and writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity which links us to one and the other, 
occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that they are two. 288 
Différance is thus a movement or, as Derrida writes elsewhere, a sheaf. Yet this movement 
cannot be made visible. Visible or intelligible is only that, which presents itself, such as the sign. 
The movement necessary for this presentation, this becoming present, remains ever hidden. 
Therefore, différance is not a thing. Things appear and become present. Equally, it is neither 
word, nor concept. It has neither “existence nor essence”289. Rather, it is that which opens up the 
entire world, time and space, existence and essence. The movement of différance allows for 
things to surface, become visible, become present, and, ultimately, be replaced.290  
I shall try to specify this with an etymological excursion: différence is linked to the 
French verb différer, which again stems from the Latin differre. Différer has two meanings. First, 
it refers to the “action of putting off until later”291. That is, it has a temporising aspect. Second, it 
also entails the notion of being different from something else. This latter notion, to Derrida, is 
spatial, as the non-identity of things divides space, and is thus the becoming of space. Différance 
refers to both meanings of the verb différer. This is, once more, best explained with the ‘sign’. 
Usually, the sign is used to describe the thing in itself. Said otherwise, with its becoming present, 
it puts off the presence of the thing in itself – or any other sign – only for the latter to become 
present again in the future: this is temporisation. At the same time, to gain meaning – i.e., to be 
present – the sign has to differentiate itself from every other present thing. It must divide the 
present into space: this is spacing. Anything appearing in presence is thus an effect of a 
differentiating movement, responsible for the becoming of time and space. Yet, as Derrida goes 
on,  
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This does not mean that the différance that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple 
and unmodified – in-different – present. Différance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and 
differentiating origin of differences. Thus the name ‘origin’ no longer suits it.292 
There is no author of différance, no subject controlling it.293 Rather, différance is best thought of 
as play – that is, a nonstrategic but still structured movement – between differences, between 
effects without a cause. In consequence, the subject, too, is to be thought of merely as an effect of 
différance. Indeed, to Derrida, the (self-)conscious subject is “a ‘function’ of language”294. Not 
only must it conform to a system of language already at play before the subject’s coming into 
being and claiming speech. The conscious subject also merely becomes comprehensible if 
opposed to or differentiated from what it is not (unconscious, an object, other, etc.).295 
We, as beings who approach the world in language thus remain captured by this play. We 
cannot go beyond it. This entails one major difference between Derrida and Lévinas. While 
Lévinas regards the face-to-face as (non)place, from which the world can begin by being 
presented, Derrida concludes that the origin of this world – this ‘irrevocable past’ – cannot be 
found. In fact, the beginning – the very first placing of something as present – was already an 
iteration, a repetition, a setting in and of difference. Therefore, to Derrida, the idea of a full 
presence, of something existing in purity – even with regards to the origin of this world – has to 
be dropped. Presence is “a determination or an effect within a system which is no longer that of 
presence but of différance”296, and in which every present thing carries the trace of what it is 
not.297  
In sum, that which Lévinas criticised as ‘permanence in the [S]ame’, is equally shaken by 
Derrida’s critique of the ‘metaphysics of the presence’. To both, there is no purely conscious and 
isolated subject taking part in universal reason, in accordance to which the intelligible is favoured 
over the sensible, concept over intuition, culture over nature, etc. At the same time and unlike 
Lévinas, Derrida sees no way to escape the realm of the Same, immanence, and the unfolding of 
Being. What hence, of transcendence, ethics and a pure peace? 
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3.2.2  A God Involved in War 
 
Human beings, to Derrida, do not live outside the conceptual, outside language. Language is the 
medium through which we approach the world. In Derrida’s view, there is no language without 
concepts, or, as he says, “without phrase”298. Consequently, there is neither a language nor a 
subject that escapes the realm of the Same. Otherness in all its aspects needs to be pointed toward 
from within the language of the Same – the only language there is. Exteriority, for example – that 
which is not immanence – still has to be named within the “Inside-Outside structure”299 of space; 
just as in-finity cannot be stated but negatively, by addressing that which is not: finite. Last, if the 
Other is approached as positive otherness, he becomes “unthinkable, impossible, unutterable”300. 
In other words, if the Other is to mean anything within language – if the discourse of Lévinas is 
to make any sense – he cannot be ‘placed’ beyond the origin of the world, he cannot be positively 
infinite. He has to be finite and mortal, “body, glance, speech, and thought”301 in one. If not, the 
separation between soul and body would have to be reintroduced, which is most certainly not 
Lévinas’ ambition. As Martin Hägglund notes, Derrida thus turns Levinas’ argument against 
itself.302 Still, the questioning of Lévinas’ elaboration itself is not Derrida’s main concern. Rather, 
by pointing out the inconsistencies and silent implications in Lévinas’ discourse, he wishes to 
express a more fundamental worry about the possibility that language as such can designate that 
which lies beyond itself. There is a betrayal of thought by language in languages’ inability to 
name the “positive plenitude of classical infinity”303.304  
What Derrida aims at is the inability of a philosophical discourse to go beyond language 
in order to find and state its own origin. According to him, this origin is inscribed in a movement 
of difference – of différance – which oscillates between, for example, the meaning of inside and 
outside, day and night, the philosophical and the non-philosophical, or the Same and the Other. 
There is no purity of origin. Everything found and named is always already included in the world 
and the light that follows; just as anything beyond it is ‘unthinkable, impossible, unutterable’. 
Accordingly, speech cannot be detached from the violence of a language rooted in light and 
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space. I cannot go beyond that, which marks the horizon of our world, to meet the Other with the 
pure nonviolence of a speech freed from world, Being, history, etc. – all concepts that, to 
Lévinas, mark an alliance with the Same and hence carry within them both violence and war. 
Language, Derrida concludes, “in its entirety already has awakened as a fall into light”305.306  
Equally has God – as symbol of positive infinity. Because God is infinite, and thus 
encompassing everything, he cannot purely be life. The classical conception of God as both all 
life and infinity at the same time, does not make sense. God necessarily needs to be  
at once All and Nothing, Life and Death. Which means that God is or appears, is named within the 
difference between All and Nothing, Life and Death. Within difference, and at bottom as Difference 
itself. This difference is what is called History. God is inscribed in it.307  
In the same way, he is ‘implicated in war’308. This is so because war would only cease to exist in 
a world in which the face of the Other is fully respected – “as that which is not of this world”309 – 
or in a world in which it is absolutely not. That is, the end of war only occurs at the end of 
speech. Again, Derrida turns Lévinas against himself. To Lévinas, peace lies in speech. This, 
Derrida argues, means that the Other needs to be acknowledged without foregoing language, as 
absolute respect (as pure nonviolence) and disrespect (as pure violence) of the Other amount to 
the same thing: silence. Speech has its roots in war, which is  
the only system whose basis permits us to speak […]. With or without God, there would be no war. 
War supposes and excludes God. We can have a relation to God only within such a system. Therefore 
war – for war there is – is the difference between the face and the finite world without a face. But is 
not this difference that which has always been called the world, in which the absence-presence of God 
plays?310311 
 
According to Derrida, there is thus an original inevitability to the violence of discourse. He thus 
shares Lévinas’ understanding of violence as all that which disrespects a singular being. 
Language and consequently also speech are bound to light. Therefore language institutes war. 
However, this war is not violence of the worst kind. Pure violence reigns only when discourse 
ceases to be, when the Other is no longer approached in dialogue. The worst violence is that of a 
silence absolutely disrespecting the Other. We – as philosophers and human beings – therefore 
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have to speak. We have to engage in war if we want to avoid a total victory of the Same, and, 
with, it the final defeat of the Other. Only thus do we take on the full responsibility for a peace 
within history; the only peace, which, according to Derrida, is in fact possible. For a philosophy 
aware of this, aware of its own being placed within history – as violent play between the face and 
its nullification – “[n]onviolence would be the telos, and not the essence of discourse.”312 Any 
philosophical discourse concerned about peace thus needs to take the route of war. This is what 
Derrida calls the “[e]conomy of violence”313, in which violence is used to fight the worst crime, 
the worst violence, in which dialogue would cease to exist.314  
History, then, takes on a new meaning. No longer is it thought of in terms of totality. In 
fact, history, to Derrida, is exactly that which departs from totality, as “the very movement of 
transcendence, of the excess over the totality without which no totality would appear as such”315. 
Transcendence and immanence – the infinite and finite – merge, and in their difference, in this 
play, becoming and history evolve. However, this does not also imply a departure from the 
violence of history. History remains violent: “becoming is war. This polemic is language itself. 
Its inscription.” 316  Language inscribes (lat. scibere, ‘to write’) itself, it moves between 
differences, and hence engages in war. Still, Derrida tentatively asks whether writing might lend 
itself more easily to peace than speech. Writing, he argues, “can assist itself, for it has time and 
freedom, escaping better than speech from empirical urgencies.”317. There is less pressure in the 
written page than in the face-to-face. By writing, it might be easier for the Other to escape 
presence, to be absent, by the time I receive his word. I might also choose a less violent style 
when using writing instead of speech, as I am not present when the Other reads my words, and 
can therefore not harvest their effects. Yet, Derrida is far from stating any peaceful purity of 
writing – as he would denounce any purity as such. Even while writing, I can still hope to defer 
my finitude by handing down the signs I produce. Therefore, to Derrida, the “limit between 
violence and nonviolence is perhaps not between speech and writing but within each of 
them”318.319  
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Speak and write, both we must do; the first in order to avoid the worst violence; the 
second because it offers a hunch of what this play of différance might be, the play in which we 
remain captured, but in which we still need to state the ‘unthinkable, impossible, unutterable’. 
Only this way can the non-strategic structure of this play ever be allowed to change toward a 
better, historical peace. This peace, according to Derrida, needs both the Other as phenomenon 
and alter ego, and the thought of Being. In fact, it is Derrida’s view that even Lévinas’ argument 
cannot do without them.320 Deliberating on this, I shall thus now take an excursion into Derrida’s 




3.2.3  Rehabilitating Phenomenology and Ontology 
 
If the Other is to be truly respected, Derrida argues, he needs to appear and make sense as other. 
In fact, he is only other to and hence because of me. Respect for the Other therefore requires him 
to become a phenomenon. Yet, the Other would be a phenomenon of a special kind, one that 
eludes my grasp.321 I would see him as alter ego, as other interiority, and hence other origin of 
this world, but I could not thematically represent him in my thought. To deny the fact that the 
Other, too, is an ego – an ego to which, however, I have no access – would, in Derrida’s view, be 
to deny the Other altogether. Because, it is his egoity that marks the difference between him and 
any other object I have in mind. The heterogeneity of the Same and the Other are hence not as 
absolute as Lévinas wishes. As Derrida writes, the Other “cannot be absolutely exterior to the 
[S]ame without ceasing to be other; and […] consequently, the [S]ame is not a totality closed in 
upon itself”322. This leads, once more, to the origin of language and thought as inscription, as 
written origin.323 In the words of Derrida, 
the other is absolutely other only if he is an ego, that is, in a certain way, if he is the same as I. 
Inversely, the other as res is simultaneously less other […] and less ‘the same’ than I. Simultaneously 
more and less other, […] this contradiction […], this impossibility of translating my relation to the 
other into the rational coherence of language […] are not the signs of ‘irrationality’: they are the sign, 
rather, that one may no longer draw inspiration from within the coherence of the Logos, but that 
thought is stifled in the region of the origin of language as dialogue and difference. This origin, as the 
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concrete condition of rationality, is nothing less than ‘irrational’ but it could not be ‘included’ in 
language. This origin is an inscribed inscription.324 
 
This origin, as said, institutes violence. However, allowing the Other to appear to the Same – as 
Husserl did, but Lévinas did not – this violence of me having an image of the Other is the sole 
possibility for peace there is in this world. Only by understanding that the Other is both other and 
ego, just as I am both other and ego to him, by accepting this symmetry, can the possibility of my 
approaching the Other with speech – Lévinas’ ethical asymmetry – be envisaged. The result 
would not be a pure peace, but an economic one, which accepts our being trapped in an originally 
violent history evolving as oscillation between the silence of pure violence and pure 
nonviolence.325  
We cannot go beyond the world of Being to face the Other. In Being we reside and Being, 
just as phenomenality, is thus needed in order to respectfully approach the Other. This is so 
because the thought of Being, as introduced by Heidegger, allows me to let be that which 
appears. According to Derrida, it assists me in recognising the essence of a particular being. 
Derrida here, plays with the double meaning of both the verb to recognise (as both understanding 
and respecting) and the concept of essence (as both Being and the true nature of a particular 
thing). Unlike Lévinas’ interpretation, Heiddeger’s concept of Being as understood by Derrida is 
not engaged in the struggle for power. Power, like the question of primacy, can only be settled 
between two beings. Conversely, Being in itself is not a determined something. As such, it cannot 
be known. It is “but the Being-of this existent, and does not exist outside it as a foreign power, or 
as a hostile or neutral impersonal element”326. Accordingly, Being cannot be a concept nor a 
predication playing its unifying part in the form of judgement. It cannot take the form of a 
neutral, general term under which singular beings are subsumed. Without ever showing itself by 
itself, it brings beings forth, and is thus the condition for the possibility of any judgement. In 
consequence, Heidegger’s thought of Being cannot take part in the determination of a first 
philosophy, and has thus to be separated from ontology as a ‘philosophy of power’.327 
Interpreted this way, the thought of Being fits most practically into Derrida’s project. 
Sceptical of any search for or stating of a pure origin – the arché of our world – Derrida can use 
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the thought of Being to elude the fight over a first principle. Since Being is needed for all 
recognition and respect, it precedes both thought and ethics, without ever reigning over them. 
There is thus no need of appointing one or the other – thought or ethics – as primary. That which 
actually is first – Being – is veiled, and history – the becoming and deferring of beings – takes its 
place. Being “occurs in all respects as history and as world”328. It is hence no less violent than 
phenomenology. Yet, like phenomenology, it is most needed in the face and for the recognition 
of the Other. Derrida concludes: 
A Being without violence would be a Being which would occur outside the existent [outside a living 
being]; nothing; nonhistory; nonoccurrence; nonphenomenality. A speech produced without the least 
violence would determine nothing, would say nothing, would offer nothing to the other; it would not 
be history, and it would show nothing; in every sense of the word, and first of all the Greek sense, it 
would be speech without phrase.329 
There is a contradiction in Lévinas’ thought. Speech outside the realm of Being – true peace – 
would “not only propose an ethics without law […], but a language without phrase”330. This, to 
Derrida, cannot be. Because the face, besides being glance is also speech, word, and thus phrase, 
implicating history and violence: “[o]ne never escapes the economy of war”331.332 
On the one hand, it could be said that Derrida gives in to a certain pragmatism. The 
determination and institution of peace necessarily have to take place within history, within the 
play of war. Only thus can the worst violence – that of a silence fully negating the Other – be 
evaded. Declaring peace therefore amounts to choosing the least violence possible. The purity of 
Lévinas’ face-to-face would amount to an unthinkable illusion. On the other hand, some of 
Derrida’s more recent texts on issues such as justice and forgiveness suggest that he and Lévinas 
are not so far apart after all. According to Derrida, justice, forgiveness, and ultimately peace, in 
their purity do remain ‘unthinkable, impossible, unutterable’ – a madness. But they are 
nevertheless indispensable for a justice-oriented politics within history. In the end, when 
considering peace, Derrida’s approach might point toward a movement between pragmatism and 
madness. And it is to this movement I shall now turn.  
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3.2.4  Justice, Forgiveness, and the Necessity of Deconstruction 
 
There is, Derrida argues, a difference between justice as such and justice as instituted and 
executed law. This is important, as it implies that a certain law, as well as the act of respecting or 
defending it, are not necessarily just. Laws are enforced. That is, their institution and perpetuation 
do not merely gain legitimacy with reference to their apparent representation of justice. Laws are 
respected because they linked to a power able to penalise lawbreakers. The law necessitates the 
use of force. It is the “mystical foundation of [its] authority”333. However, not every ability to 
enforce compliant behaviour is legitimate. There is for example, the often-named case of the 
tyrant who makes use of violence in an illegitimate way. Justice as law therefore represents the 
middle ground between unjust violence and justice as such. Or rather, it represents the worldly 
form of justice, by channelling and monopolising the necessity of historical violence by the 
means of legalisation. Within this world, there is either illegitimate violence, or legitimate force. 
Yet, in Derrida’s view, this latter distinction is not as clear. According to him, the 
institutionalisation of justice as law is always linked to an act of violence regardless of the power, 
instituting it. He notes,  
The operation that consists of founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), making law would consist 
of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just 
nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee 
or contradict or invalidate.334  
This is most visible in the founding of the state, which in its determination necessarily holds a 
violent act, even if horrors such as genocide, deportation, and expulsion do not take place – 
although, according to Derrida, they most often do. State formation takes place in a limbo 
between an old (no longer applied) and a new (not yet applicable) corpus of law, which is needed 
to distinguish violence from force. For that reason, the violence of initiating the existence of a 
state can only retrospectively be turned into a legitimate and necessary use of force.335  
The foundation of law – the legitimisation of force – thus bears within itself an originally 
violent structure, which disappears as soon as law is first stated, legitimised, and henceforth 
executed. By the act of law’s inauguration, violence and force are linked. Justice as law is a 
                                                
333 Derrida, 1990, p. 937 
334 Derrida, 1990, pp. 941-943 
335 See: Derrida, 1990, pp. 925-961 & 987-993 
64 
 
violence made legal.336 Herein lies a danger. Not only does the act of founding law elude 
judgement, as it takes place within a lawless sphere. Any inequality or use of violence prior to the 
institutionalisation of law is hidden precisely with and by this institutionalisation. The problem 
here is that the inauguration of law – for example in a revolutionary act – always takes place 
within a historical moment with prevalent inequalities. As, in this context, it is often “not possible 
to make the just strong, the strong […] [are] made just”337.338 
Justice as such is betrayed as soon as it is introduced to this world. It cannot be instituted 
in its purity. Justice is that which is “infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to 
symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic”339, that, which deals with the singularity of the Other 
without falling prey to its own ambitions of universality. The language of Lévinas lends itself 
even to Derrida who is hesitant to use it and sceptical of its implications. Justice as such – equity, 
perhaps – might be something like “absolute dissymmetry”340 foreign to the calculated equality of 
law. It is  
irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, 
without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation, and without rules, 
without rationality. And so we can recognize in it, indeed accuse, identify a madness.341  
Justice as such is mad. In its infinite demand, it escapes rational consideration. The calculable 
character of justice as law is foreign to it. However, despite their heterogeneous nature, justice as 
such and justice as law cannot be separated in their consideration, as the latter holds the ambition 
to speak in the name of the former. According to Derrida, three aporias can be gained from 
this.342  
Firstly, executed justice as law, in order to appear just, always needs to be fresh. 
Simultaneous to its referral to a general rule, a just judgement must seem to examine the 
distinctiveness of every given situation. In a just judgement the rule thus appears as if stated for 
the first time, as if the general rule is both disregarded and recreated. The judgement itself hence 
appears as both with and without regulation. That is, any present – any moment of – decision or 
judgement, re-connects with the original violent act of a law’s inauguration and can never be just 
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as such. Likewise and secondly, it escapes full distinctiveness. The moment a judgement is made, 
the exact moment of decision, always inhibits an in-decidability, a spontaneity, irreducible to the 
rational, legal examination it was preceded by. A legal judgement can thus never be fully owned, 
never be entirely controlled. In its decision, something escapes being grasped. There is, again, an 
indecisiveness to a judgement as just in and out of itself. Consequently and thirdly, a decision is 
always rash. It eludes all juridical, ethical or political pre-consideration. The instant a decision is 
made is therefore the closest we can come to this madness, which is alien to the rational discourse 
of truth and propriety. In its in-decidability and hastiness, the decision-making instant speaks of 
the possibility of a justice free from violence.343  
What does Derrida conclude from this? On the one hand, the notion that justice is 
somehow infinitely granted, without ever expecting anything in return, which in its structure is 
very similar to Lévinas’ prelingual and prejural ethics, does indeed suggest it to be mad – that is, 
to be of the realm Derrida calls ‘unthinkable, impossible, unutterable’. On the other hand, justice 
is still craved and its impossibility within the realm of rationality must not necessarily lead to its 
abandonment. Within history, a specific kind of attitude can be chosen, in order to do justice 
justice. That attitude is the attitude of the question, of deconstruction. The latter, Derrida writes, 
“takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the 
deconstructibility of droit [justice as law]”344. It arises in the face of the ambiguous, of the 
aporetic, and introduces a movement of destabilisation with regards to long-held values – such as 
those of property or the proper, the subject, and intentionality. Yet, no new statement does arise 
from it. Deconstruction merely questions; any construction following it is an indirect effect. This 
way, deconstruction – as much as possible within this world – evades the violence of 
determination. Thence, Derrida concludes that “[d]econstruction is justice”345. We – especially as 
philosophers – have thus an incalculable responsibility and obligation to deconstruct, to be the 
open question of  
history, the origin and subsequent direction, thus the limits, of concepts of justice, the law and law 
(droit), of values, norms, prescriptions that have been imposed and sedimented there, from then on 
remaining more or less readable or presupposed.346  
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Deconstruction is especially needed where good conscience chooses to lazily rest with a pre-
given determination of justice.347 To remain awake in the face of the impossible: Does this not 
sound very similar to Lévinas? In Derrida’s treatise on forgiveness, ethics indeed announces itself 
as madness from beyond. 
In fact, “[i]n principle, there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no ‘to 
what point?’”348. Only the unforgivable can be forgiven. That is, forgiveness does not aim at the 
restoration of normality, of a balance between victim and perpetrator. It does not lend itself to 
calculation. In order for it to be pure, forgiveness “should remain exceptional and extraordinary 
[…]: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality”349. Unconditional and 
uneconomic, pure forgiveness is not part of an exchange in which the perpetrator asks for and the 
victim grants forgiveness. It is given to both “the fault and the guilty”350, despite and because of 
the fact that there is no hope of the latter to ever repent. Forgiveness, therefore, resembles an 
infinite movement. It seems unthinkable, impossible: a madness. Forgiveness, Derrida concludes, 
is irreducible to politics or the law. In effect, it remains heterogeneous, unknown to 
consciousness altogether. It “cannot, if it must not present itself as such, and thus exhibit itself in 
consciousness without at the same time denying itself, betraying of reaffirming a 
sovereignty”351.352  
However, Derrida continues, forgiveness is often confused with other, more easily 
measured and calculated concepts such as reconciliation, and with it “excuse, regret, amnesty, 
prescription”353. Linked to these, forgiveness has taken on a key aspect in post-intrastate conflict 
scenarios – the most famous of which is perhaps the holding of truth commissions. This 
“globalisation of the scene of repentance”354, to Derrida, has its origin in the Nuremberg Trial, 
where “legal concepts such as ‘crime against humanity’”355 were first born. There is, Derrida 
writes, something ironic to this public and spectacular self-accusation by and of the human race. 
In addition, the concept of ‘crime against humanity’ seems to suggest a sacredness linked to the 
human being. A sacredness, which, in fact, has its root in the Abrahamic – that is, Jewish, but 
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especially Christian – tradition, where concepts such as ‘neighbour’ and ‘fellow creature’ take on 
a central role. Derrida therefore suggests the globalisation of reconciliation processes to be the 
silent continuation of a “Christian convulsion-conversion-confession”356 outside the Christian 
church.357  
All this does not mean that processes of reconciliation should not take place. There is, 
Derrida admits, a need for memory, mourning, and, even amnesty, in order for the state to 
function again. However, it should not be forgotten that offerings of reconciliation and amnesty 
often contain a strategic element. They are a pragmatic approach. It should therefore be stressed 
that this “reconstitution of a health or a ‘normality’ as necessary and desirable as it would appear 
[…], is not forgiveness; it is only a political strategy or a psycho-therapeutic economy”358. 
Forgiveness and the political process of reconciliation represent the two poles of the 
unconditional and the conditional. As such, they remain irreconcilable, “absolutely 
heterogeneous”359. At the same time, they cannot be separated.360 As Derrida writes, 
If one wants, and it is necessary, forgiveness to become effective, concrete, historic; if one wants it to 
arrive, to happen by changing things, it is necessary that this purity engage itself in a series of 
conditions of all kinds.361  
In the end, Derrida remains torn between what he calls the “‘hyperbolic’ ethical vision of 
forgiveness and the reality of a society at work in pragmatic processes of reconciliation”362. He 
remains undecided between a desire for purity and unconditional ethics, where the worst crimes 
can be forgiven without repentance, and the pragmatism in which we, as historical beings, need 
to engage in order to navigate and negotiate our way toward a peace within history. Ultimately, 
knowing that only a historical peace is possible, or in fact thinkable, Derrida contents himself 
with the necessity of a reference toward that which overflows mind and time. 363  The 
‘unthinkable, impossible, unutterable’ has to remain the reference point of law and politics, not as 
its essence, but as unreachable telos. Pure, infinite justice and forgiveness – perhaps not so far 
away from Lévinas’ vision of goodness and peace in the face-to-face – will never arrive. They 
remain what is always yet to come. Because, as Behnke writes, life implies difference, 
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antagonism and conflict. It implies history and change. Infinite, ‘perpetual peace’ on the other 
hand, is a peace of the dead. What conclusions, then, can be gained from the dialogue between 
Lévinas and Derrida with regards to peace? 
 
3.3  Another Conclusion – Attacking Good Conscience 
 
First of all, it is to be noted that Lévinas did respond to the criticism Derrida raised in Violence 
and Metaphysics. While in Totality and Infinity Lévinas merely differentiates between language 
as thought and language as speech, a new distinction is introduced in his later work Otherwise 
than Being. Here, speech is presented as holding both the act of saying and the conveying of what 
is being said.364 This underscores in more detail that the relation I have with the Other is not prior 
to language as thought, prior to politics, and the roles we take in society. There is not first speech, 
and then thought in a sense which makes the primacy of speech another present that has slid into 
the past. In speech, the saying is ‘past perfect’, diachronous to the common understanding of 
time. It has neither been present, nor is it reachable by the means of my consciousness. There is 
thus an aspect of speech – the saying – which interrupts the order of time from beyond. Without 
it, speech in the traditional sense – in which a phrase with a message is transmitted – could not 
take place.365 As William P. Simmons notes,  
Prior to the speech act, the speaker must address the Other, and before the address is the approach of 
the Other or proximity. Before any speech, before any intention to speak, there is an ‘exposure of the 
ego to the other, the non-indifference to another’, which is not a simple ‘intention to address a 
message’. The saying includes not only the content of the speech, but the process itself which includes 
the Thou who is addressed and the speaker as attendant to the spoken word.366  
As said, it is the saying that allows me to be close to the Other, and thereby initiates me as an ‘I’ 
infinitely responsible for the Others well-being. But speech is not only saying. It always consists 
of both the saying and the said – that is thematisation, meaning conveyed. Ethics, to Lévinas, is 
not something outside the realm of Being in a spatial or temporal sense; it disturbs Being, 
immanence, and also the order of politics, because it escapes our means of cognition. “[N]on-
thematizable, non-utterable, impossible”367 ethics is that which interrupts “Derrida’s world of the 
                                                
364 See: Lévinas, 1981, pp. 5-7 
365 See: Simmons, 1999, pp. 87-89 




violent language”368, the world of truth, of politics, and estimations of justice. According to 
Simmons, Lévinas is well aware of the violence the order of justice and politics entails. It is, after 
all, making use of truth, judgement, and cognition. Yet, in this violence there is a movement that 
oscillates between the saying and the said, a movement that is often neglected. Therefore, “[s]teps 
must be taken to maintain the potency of the ethical saying”369. Ethics as the foundation of truth 
must not be forgotten. Philosophy’s primary task should subsequently be to constantly remind of, 
and keep watch over the “oscillation between the saying and the said”370.371 This is so because, in 
the words of Annabel Herzog, 
something can be ‘said’ about the interaction of ethics and politics, because of politics. If human 
relations were only ethics – that is if there were only two persons facing each other – philosophy 
would be impossible. Philosophy […] emerges in society as a social activity, namely, as a process of 
knowledge, foundation, representation comprehension, ‘totalisation’. Lévinas aims at showing that 
there is an ‘alternative (non-Greek) approach to meaning and truth’, that is, at revealing in philosophy 
the irreducible otherness which resists the philosophical logos, the ‘ability of philosophy … to unsay 
itself’. Still, philosophy is essentially Greek: when he describes the dual relation, Lévinas proposes a 
thought about holiness, not holiness itself.372  
As this citation shows, Lévinas and Derrida are much closer than it first appears. Both are led by 
a deep concern with regards to the possibility of respecting alterity – the Other for what he or she 
singularly is. This concern springs from an uneasiness, caused by both the Western tradition of 
thought, and the politics that emanate from it. The West is taken by both to be slumbering in 
good conscience, denying the violence of its universalising and neutralising claims to truth, and 
its political, economic, but also cultural imperialism. Both Lévinas and Derrida trace the 
problems of this violence to a particular thought of originality, of arché, which sets the rational 
subject as centre and initiator of the world as we see it. In other words, both criticise the 
predominant Western understanding of autonomous and self-present subjectivity. In opposition, 
they introduce the world as without having a traceable origin. In fact, within the realm of Being, 
human beings have a conceptual, and hence lingual relation to the world. That which gives rise to 
the possibility of cognition thus necessarily lies beyond comprehension. It is an-archic. Equally, 
both regard the an-archic origin of the world to lie in a movement of irreducible relatedness. In 
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the thought of Lévinas, the world arises due to my infinite desire and responsibility for the Other 
– introducing a movement towards that which I am not, without this movement ever reaching an 
end. Différance, on the other hand, points towards meaning unfolding due to an oscillation 
between what is and what is not, between that which is set and that which is deferred, neglected, 
denied, etc. Forgetting this an-archic original movement of relation to both means making way 
for rationally legitimised subjugation and domination.373  
In short, purely residing in a world of Being controlled by an autonomous subject not only 
denies that which makes subjectivity possible in the first place; it also gives rise to violence. Both 
Lévinas and Derrida hereby operate with a very wide understanding of violence as that which 
negates the singularity of another being. Violence is not regarded as an affective outburst of 
force. It cannot be restricted to the irrationality of physical harm, opposed to the rationality of a 
transactional peace. Rather, physical violence is merely the expression of an approach to the 
world, in which the ego is thought to be self-present, in control, and above all valuable, and to be 
protected in its autonomy. Violence is the expression of ontology as egology, of logocentrism, 
and thus inherently dormant in the Western tradition, not opposed to it. Violence is that which 
works according to the rules of logic and rationality. Peace, on the other hand, is mad, 
unutterable, and incomprehensible. According to both Lévinas and Derrida, it is the task and 
responsibility of philosophy to constantly be vigilant with regards to and remind us of this. They 
differ, however, with regards to what form this responsibility, and its political implications are to 
take.374 
Lévinas, like Derrida, locates the possibility of peace as pure goodness performed for the 
Other in the pre-linguistic realm. Peace is ethical. However, unlike Derrida, he does not 
fatalistically conclude the impossibility of nonviolence. Instead, he calls everybody to his or her 
responsibility of letting the ethical moment back into our social relations. If peace cannot be 
conceptualised, controlled or planned, it has to be performed. In other words, Lévinas demands 
ethical practice, the very act of leaving the familiar paths of a life merely concerned about its own 
survival and benefit in order to openly receive and abide by the Other’s call for help. So much is 
clear, and not enough; because, the Other is not the only one I will meet on the street. In his eyes, 
I equally see the third party. I see all those out of my reach, whose lives will eventually be 
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betrayed by my inability to attend to the needs of all. Ethics – my relation to the Other – cannot 
be absolute. It is torn open by the third party – the multiplicity and plurality of all humanity – 
which calls for justice, and, with it, politics. So, just as there is no saying in itself, ethics does not 
suffice in an attempt at peace. The first, second, and third party do not appear in a chronological 
order. They inexchangebly and irreducibly exist at the same time. Accordingly, there 
simultaneously have to be both ethics – my responsibility for the Other – and politics – justice for 
all others: ethics in order to remind equalising politics of my indebtedness to the Other; politics in 
order to assist me in fulfilling the impossible task of being infinitely responsible for all humanity. 
As Victoria Tahmasebi writes, “[f]or Lévinas, not only do politics and the state originate in 
goodness, but goodness must be present in every working of politics”375. Justice in the form of 
laws and institutions is called for, to facilitate the state’s duty to secure the fulfilment of ethical 
responsibility.376  
Conversely, Derrida does not believe in the possibility of an ethics in which I can fully 
respect the Other for what he is. As Martin Hägglund notes, there exists a “necessity of 
discrimination”377 in the thought of Derrida. This is so, because the violent play of différance is 
needed for any ethical consideration or practice. The Other is only other in relation to me. 
Likewise, I have to acknowledge, and consequently thematise him as such. There cannot be any 
respect for the Other, if he does not somehow appear in the phenomenal world. This is not to say 
that the Other is fully accessible to my mind. In the phenomenal play of différance, within Being, 
he is still irreducible, and hence a mystery to me. The consequences of attributing phenomenality 
to the Other are fundamental. Not only does Derrida insist that a pure – i.e., non-violent – peace 
is impossible; he equally introduces violence as something productive. Without violence, nothing 
would be determined. There would be no ‘thing’. Violence is thus not to be regarded as 
inherently bad. However, if it is forgotten that every determination produces exclusion, 
domination and destructive violence will inevitably haunt us. In consequence, there is a moral 
claim in Derrida’s approach that asks us to aim at the least violence possible within the play of 
différance. One way to ensure this “lesser violence”378 lies in the art of deconstruction. Jack 
Reynolds interprets deconstruction as consisting of two steps, “the first being the reversal or 
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inversion of the prioritised term of a metaphysical opposition, and the second being the 
displacement or disruption of that opposition by corrupting it from within”379. Said otherwise, 
deconstruction is needed where hierarchical oppositions – such as culture vs. nature, or the 
subject vs. the other, or the object – are normalised by good conscience. What it does is to show 
the logical and normative inappropriateness of the opposition, without stating or determining 
anything new – that is, without instituting another, potentially violating opposition. This is not to 
say, that no action should be taken to create a society as peaceful as possible. There is a need to 
both try and attend to the singularity of every human being, and at the same time shape and 
institutionalise a political, legal and economic order. Authority cannot be abolished; it needs to be 
constantly questioned, because “there is no ‘centred structure’, no ‘fundamental ground’”380, by 
reference to which a convergence with prescribed ethics can be guaranteed. As Reynolds writes, 
For Derrida, responsibility to the other is such that we cannot know whether we have or haven’t made 
a mistake by them. In deciding, we endure the trial of undecidability that ensures that there is no right 
answer, since the decision is that which must leap into the unknown.381 
Deconstructive criticism does not measure given injustices or violations by comparing them to 
another desired state. Such criticism must remain a process, without knowing where it might lead. 
Peace is a madness, and in its purity – without a name, but a deep concern for the well being of 
every Other in his or her singularity – it always remains to come.382  
Rather than providing a conclusion, Lévinas and Derrida hence ask us to take the attitude 
of an open question. As much as possible, we first need to be open to the arrival of the singular 
Other, even though he might never fully arrive and become present to our consciousness. Second, 
we have to remain vigilant when it comes to the translation of the ethical realm – that which is 
pure, and hence unutterable, unthinkable, non-thematisable – into the rational calculation of 
politics and the law. Third, we must embrace an attitude of suspicion wherever good conscience 
rests all-to-comfortably on absolutisms, or totalisations presented as universal, neutral, fixed, and 
present in themselves. No absoluteness or totality can exist without exclusion. We – as beings 
that make use of determination to orient themselves – therefore have a responsibility to look out 
for that and look after those left out. Exclusion and disrespect for the singular are inherent aspects 
of our lingual system. They will never cease to be. Yet, in being attentive, in embodying this 
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threefold attitude of an open question, the ‘greater violence’ that could spring from determination 
in the form of domination, imperialism, colonisation, war, etc. might be reduced. Rather than a 
state of being, attained by merely engineering the right conditions for it to perpetually prosper, 
worldly peace, according to Lévinas and Derrida, is a process of approximation to a purity never 
to be reached. It needs to be performed, constantly changed and kept in check, knowing that some 
form of violence will always be a part of our lives. Violence we can know and recognise, not 
peace. To approach peace, we cannot plan, or mechanically engineer standardised forms of 
social, political legal, and economic organisation: we need to take a walk into the open.383  
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4  Discussion – The Liberal Peace Revisited 
 
In the preceeding chapters, I have introduced the liberal peace as a coin with two sides. I have 
described the theoretical discourse on the liberal peace as drawing mainly on ideas and ideals of 
the Enlightenment period and encompassing three sets of ideas. First, the liberal peace includes 
concepts of political philosophy to appease the natural state of men and to safeguard the life, 
freedom and property of every individual via the means of an original social contract. Second, it 
comprises liberal theories of international relations, and their focus on international regulation, 
laws and institutions. Third, it consists of economic approaches regarding the necessity of trade 
and the free market as inherent to human nature. These three aspects of the liberal discourse – 
democratic states, international regulation and free trade – represent the cornerstones of the 
liberal (Western) condition, of which Wilson is said to be the founding father, and which is 
described by Doyle as fundamentally different from the rest of the world, because it is lacking 
internal conflict. To the liberal family it might hence seem like a logical consequence to globally 
spread its supposedly peaceful liberal condition via the highly standardised and comprehensive 
means of liberal peacebuilding. 
Yet, as I have argued, the liberal story of continuing progress and growing peace has a 
downside, which can also be traced back to ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment. A look at the 
historical context of the Enlightenment period, as well as the developments that followed it, show 
that liberal politics are not as pure and violence-free as described by their supporters. Racism, 
colonialism, the slave trade, and the – often violent – engineering of cooperative governments 
leave a brutal trail in liberal history-writing. If looked at from its downside, liberalism thus seems 
to be part of a grand strategy of domination and exploitation. In other words, liberalism and 
imperialism appear to be closely linked. Liberal imperialism is maintained at all levels of society. 
As a global ‘capitalist socio-economic order’, it perpetuates liberal principles that do not benefit 
those asked to institute them, but those asking. Despite fostering and upholding inequality and 
structures of exploitation, liberal principles as well as the interventions that attempt to institute 
them are legitimised by a thorough moral discourse, of which R2P is but one example. Last, these 
liberal principles are implemented on a local level, whereby the population affected is often met 
with generalised stereotypes, as a consequence of which it is disregarded or pushed aside. 
The liberal peace, I conclude, as Richmond does, is in need of being changed. However, it 
is questionable if Richmond’s turning toward the local-local will actually be able to leave the 
75 
 
liberal trap of imposing identities on those, thought to be in need of our help. The local-local is 
but another category thought to tell the good from the bad. It does not assist in meeting the 
human beings affected by violent intrastate conflict for what they are. I have suggested that this 
might be the case, because problems of racism and stereotypes lie much deeper than in picking 
the right approach to local peacebuilding. They might lie in our very basic understanding of what 
it means to be human and how we relate to and engage in the world. Consequently, an inquiry 
regarding the philosophical foundations of the liberal peace is urgently called for.  
In what follows I shall therefore juxtapose the liberal peace with the philosophical 
approaches of Lévinas and Derrida. I think it is important to note that both Lévinas and Derrida 
have been claimed to be of liberal heritage. I will consider these claims separately for each 
philosopher in order to subsequently ask what critique and alternatives Lévinas and Derrida 
might offer to the hegemonic liberal peace discourse. 
 
4.1  Lévinas on Private Property and Embodied Peace 
 
According to Simmons, Lévinas sees the ideal of a self-critical order of justice and politics 
fulfilled in the liberal state.384 Simmons draws this conclusion form a statement made by Lévinas 
in The Paradox of Morality, where Lévinas writes, 
There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are 
further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice 
is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal 
state. The liberal state is a state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a 
perfection. Concretely the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights 
as a parallel institution. […] And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal 
state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.385  
A liberal reading of this statement is indeed problematic for the argument I want to make in the 
thesis at hand. Equally problematic is Simon Critchley’s accusation of Lévinas’ focus on 
fraternity, monotheism, filiality, etc. as being androcentric, and of his attitude toward Israel as 
being that of a Zionist.386 Outside the Greek and the Jewish tradition, Critchley cites Lévinas as 
                                                
384 See: Simmons, 1999, pp. 90-100 
385 Lévinas, in: Simmons, 1999, p. 99 
386 At this point, I want to avoid any misunderstanding or accusations with regards to anti-Semitism. I myself do 
have a Jewish background. However, I think it utterly important to openly discuss the controversies and violent 
patterns of domination that Israel is engaged in. An uncritical Zionist stance, therefore, can pose a problem when it 
76 
 
saying that there is either the yellow peril – Russia and China – or merely exotic dance, both of 
which do not fully embrace human nature. Nonetheless, Critchley is optimistic about finding a 
“nonfraternalistic, nonmonotheistic, nonandrocentric, nonfilial, nonfamilial, and non-Zionist 
conception of the relation of ethics and politics”387 within Lévinas’ approach,388 and so am I. In 
fact, like Tahmasebi I will argue that, if thoroughly analysed, it becomes clear that “there is a 
radical distance between Lévinas’ thought and the Western liberal tradition”389. 
 
 
4.1.1  Progress for Whom? 
 
According to Tahmasebi, liberalism builds on three pillars: a particular conception of the 
individual, a rational interpretation of peace, and a specific kind of economic regulation. All three 
she sees rejected by Lévinas, who fundamentally criticises Western philosophy’s view of a 
rational subject able to cognitively access and materially acquire anything it finds in the world. 
The liberal peace remains trapped in the realm of the Same and its ‘egology’, because of its view 
on subjectivity as purely rational and simultaneously still self-interested. The rights and freedoms 
to be ensured by the social contract concern me and my life alone. The justice of a liberal society 
is merely instituted to maintain a more or less peaceful possibility of free trade. But trade is not 
always free, let alone just. Wars to protect self-interest continue to be waged, even by the ‘liberal 
family’. The liberal peace remains an “armed peace”390. In seeking the tranquillity and order 
necessary to appease conflicting self-interest, it does not leave the danger of totalitarianism 
behind. Because self-interest persist, the liberal peace needs to strive for domination and control, 
and thereby make (global) securitisation a top priority. Alterity needs to be colonised and made to 
disappear. This leads Tahmasebi to conclude that, from Lévinas’ point of view, the liberal society 
is a hypocritical society.391 
To get to the point: the liberal peace does not lead all of humanity to a prosperous and 
emancipatory condition. Its downside is not something that can eventually be overcome: it is 
inherently part of the liberal agenda. From a Lévinasian perspective, this is so, because of a 
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specific epistemology that considers the subject able to rationally understand, grasp, and access 
everything it meets. Colonisation and imperialism follow, on every level of society, because such 
an approach to the world does not tolerate otherness. On a global scale, the liberal peace supports 
a ‘capitalist socio-economic order’ by forming political and legal institutions that serve to secure 
the freedom to pursue economic self-interest. Cases of non-cooperation, violent conflict, or 
governments with too much of a social agenda, etc. are presented as threats to the inherent right 
of every individual to be protected in its autonomy and rationality. Restrictions of free, individual 
entrepreneurship are used to morally justify interventions that follow highly standardised pre-set 
agendas. These agends are mainly at service of the intervening countries. It is therefore not 
surprising that liberal peacebuilding is unable to respectfully meet the needs and aspirations of 
the society it intervenes in. Even a post-liberal peace remains trapped in the modus of the Same 
by imposing yet another category to which a pluralistic society has to submit itself. In short, the 
liberal peace is inherently contradictory. It fights so hard for individual freedom, and at the same 
time disrespects the singularity of every person, because the political order it seeks is meant to 
unify, and totalise. It fights in and for the realm of the Same. Liberal imperialism is the result of 
it. 
However, the most important critique of the liberal peace Lévinas has to offer remains yet 
to be named. It is an attack on the institutionalisation of private property, through the protection 
of which the liberal peace supports and perpetuates inequality and exploitation; and to what 
degree indeed. For example, if it is true that the ‘War on Terrorism’ and the interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were and are partly conducted because the West’s provision of oil is 
threatened – a threat that has been made sure to be included in a more comprehensive definition 
of security – it becomes shockingly clear, just how far the ‘liberal family’ is willing to go in order 
to perpetuate its own advantages. This is not to speak of the torture tactics applied at Abu Ghraib 
and Guantànamo, and the rational, transactional, and clinical discourse used to legitimise them.392 
By equalizing the institutionalisation of private property and inequality with freedom and peace, 
the liberal peace undeniably is hypocritical, as Tahmasebi stated. However, hypocrisy is a mild 
charge when compared to the accusations of neo-colonialism, imperialism, and the brutal 
measures applied to upkeep the hegemony of the West. What alternative, then, can be found in 
Lévinas’ approach? 
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4.1.2  Embodied Peace 
 
In Lévinas’ view, not grasping but giving lies at the heart of objectivity and truth. Openness to 
and infinite responsibility for the Other mark the ‘locus’ of peace. Drawing form this, Lévinas 
visualises a state that is directly shaped by its society; a state that respects the singularity of every 
citizen by committing to a participatory plurality, instead of being concerned with belting a false 
– because unequal – unity. Lévinas’ approach to peace thus encompasses two levels. On a face-
to-face level, peace is embodied393 and performed. It is a peace which embraces subjectivity in its 
corporeity and intentionality, and asks me to receive the Other for what he or she is. Facing the 
Other, peace is responsibility, it is ethical. For the building of peace, this might call for an 
attitude of radical humility and hesitation. It is the Other who is in need; but it is also the Other 
who demands my goodness and asks for my help. In consequence, self-appointed peacebuilding 
will ever fail to respect otherness, if it continues to mechanically replicate prearranged conditions 
apparently needed for the development of sustainable peace. If requested by the people affected 
by violent conflict, peacebuilding might at the most be a continuous process into the unknown, 
shaped by an openness to, respect for, and hence support of the needs, values, and ideas of the 
Other.  
However, with the entry of the third party, peace equally needs to become a just peace. 
That is, it needs to embrace institutionalisation, politics, and the law. Now, just what exactly the 
entry of the third party calls for is widely and controversially discussed. For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, the interpretations of Tahmasebi and Critchley might provide a useful 
complementary proposition. According to Tahmasebi, the need for political and legal institutions 
is indeed created by the entry of the third party; yet, they are founded for the sake of the Other. It 
is the protection of the Other that defines my freedom and introduces questions of rights. Like 
Marx, Tahmasebi argues, Lévinas takes into account the corporeity and materiality of suffering, 
exploitation, and injustice, and thus calls us to go beyond the present capitalist economic order. 
But Lévinas does not take a Marxist road, even though he regards the “liberation from economic 
exploitation as the ‘first freedom’”394. Beyond the formation of class-bondage, Lévinas invites us 
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fight for the rights of an Other and to foster non-reciprocal relations, based on the divinity and 
mortality of the Other’s face. In other words, ethics is to weave itself into politics.395  
Accordingly, Critchley stresses that even in politics, there “is a universal ethical criterion 
for action”396, to which I am passive and mentally oblivious, but which guides my actions all the 
same. He argues that 
if we are not going to bow beneath the fate of contemporary neoimperial power intoxicated by 
military moralism […]; if we are going to be able to face and face down the political horror of the 
present, […] then I think politics has to be empowered by a metapolitical moment of disturbance, an 
anarchic ethical injunction and the experience of an infinite ethical demand.397 
This leads him to introduce an understanding of politics that is very different from the 
present governmental order, which is blind to the an-archy of ethics. Governmental politics 
reduces politics to policing, and is very much concerned with its own origin and foundation. As 
said, it fears both multiplicity and singularity, and therefore engages in a process of pacification 
and tranquillisation by ascribing roles and defining social relations. As a consequence, Critchley 
regards any political action led by ethics as a “manifestation of dissensus”398. It has the potential 
to disturb. Following Lévinas, Critchley argues that politics needs to be understood as manifold, 
anarchic processes of emancipation and democratisation shaped by the multiplicity of the demos 
– the people. Politics, Critchley concludes, “is now, and it is many”399.400 Like peacebuilding, it 
needs to embrace the open road. Would this be Derrida’s vision, too? 
 
4.2  Derrida on Hierarchy and a Peace to Come 
 
Drawing on yet another one of Derrida’s irreducible connections between purity and pragmatism 
– the one between conditional and unconditional hospitality401 – Gideon Baker notes that, unlike 
Kant, Derrida does not provide any “universalising, programmable ethics”402 with regards to 
intervention or peacebuilding. There is an element of undecidability, when it comes to the 
morality of peace operations. Based on this undecidability, Baker sees the ethics of hospitality 
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threatened, on the one hand, by a radical ban on intervention, and on the other, by a 
“domesticating will to intervene”403. Hospitality can only be given to those, who make it to my 
home. Correspondingly, all others are in danger of being neglected. Therefore, Baker concludes 
that sometimes hospitality needs to be forsaken in order for intervention to take place. 
Intervention and hospitality, then, are both part of an ethics that is concerned with otherness, but 
that is at the same time aware of the necessity to sometimes get involved in a dirty and violent 
business, such as military interventions for peace. Baker draws on Derrida’s notion that violence 
is necessarily part of this world. Pure nonviolence is not an option. From this he concludes that 
sometimes, the least violence might be that of a humanitarian intervention.404  
This example shows very well how Derrida’s approach can be used to legitimise a very 
violent peacebuilding practice. However, it is doubtful whether it is justly done so. Baker, in my 
view, does not go far enough in his analysis as to what the historical roots of humanitarian 
interventions are, in what context the term was invented, and for what reasons its practice is 
pursued. Derrida’s approach, to me, does not seem so simple. Rather, he forces us never to rest 
comfortably on any given assumption – even one that tries to argue in favour of a responsibility 
to protect. We need to be an open question, and embody a deconstructive attitude.  
 
 
4.2.1  Light and Darkness 
 
As ‘peace spreads, it collapses. Peace becomes war and war becomes peace’. Or, as Necati Polat 
bluntly titles his article, “Peace is War.”405 These citations shed light one central aspect of a 
possible Derridean critique of the liberal peace. The liberal peace presents itself as pure, 
unarguably morally good, and thus inherently preferable over any other social arrangement. It 
regards itself, Polat writes, as present condition, as “a state of being ontologically fixed and 
secure in itself, while war is an aberration”406.407 However, pure presence does not exist. Purity 
can only be created in opposition to what it is not, or what it does not want to be. The light of 
progressing liberalism can only be upheld when opposed to the affective, primordial, brutal, and 
uncivilised ways of the rest of the world. With this, the liberal peace necessarily invites darkness, 
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brutality, and violence into its own ranks. Light always carries a trace of darkness, just as 
darkness always holds a flickering light. The seed for peace might therefore not lie where peace 
has taken on a hegemonic status, but where violence is taking place.  
Furthermore, even thought there is a play of différance, this play is not accidental. It is 
strategic. Perhaps, like a brain, it is wired, with certain connections being stronger than others. 
The perpetuation of structural inequality might just be such a strong connection. But as the play 
of différance remains invisible, this connection is equally made to disappear, by the way certain 
concepts – the visible effects of différance – are determined. A critical analysis of the liberal 
peace in line with Derrida therefore needs to first inquire about the categories with which the 
liberal peace operates, and how these categories might favour a certain interpretation of the 
world, while excluding many others. Second, it needs to analyse how these categories are used in 
favour of a very specific approach to political practice while again dismissing others. 
The opposition between the light of peace and the darkness of violence is a hierarchical 
opposition. Otherness is negatively constructed. This strongly affects our interpretation of what is 
actually going on in contexts of violent conflict. Afghanistan is an illustrative example for 
various reasons. First, it was declared a failed state, not because there was no monopoly of 
power, but because those in power – the Taliban – were not respected as political actors by the 
US. Second, in its DDR program, the ‘fighters’ to be demobilised were falsely thought to be 
unemployed and frustrated young men. The power to interpret a certain situation is hence closely 
linked to social, political and economic power. This is very well exemplified in Laura 
Appeltshauser’s discourse analysis on the use of the concept ‘violence’ within peace research. 
Peace research, Appeltshauser argues, generally operates with a very narrow 
understanding of violence. Violence 
is tacitly assumed to be physical, intentional, personal and direct […]. Violence emerges as the 
manifest product of (individual) acts, spatially and temporarily contained, not as a latent process, 
mitigated by structural factors. It is normatively charged with being negative, destructive and deviant 
from the normality of politics and the attainable harmony of communication and dialogue […]. [I]t is 
largely conceived as quantifiable step in conflict dynamics, or a measurable phenomenon, amenable to 
scientific positivist research – hardly worthy of any meta-theoretical or philosophical reflection.408  
In consequence, peace research locates most occurrence of violence in the global South. The 
often violent origins of modern states, on the other hand, are rewritten in terms of progress and 
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civilisation; our military activities presented as peace missions toward societies or regimes that 
have fallen beyond the possibility of dialogue and rational argumentation; and our perpetuation of 
economic exploitation is sold as developmental aid. In short and more fundamentally, by linking 
peace to a rational and reasonable departure from a violent state of nature, any society immersed 
in civil war can be presented as primordial, irrational, affective, and hence in need of our 
civilising advice. The definition of violence, Appeltshauser concludes, is a highly political act. 
Research is not neutral. This is not merely the case, because concepts, definitions and 
interpretations disrespect the singularity of any given situation; but because concepts perpetuate, 
and are intentionally used to uphold given power relations.409 To go back to Crush: All Western 
words need to be considered as part of an imperial world.  
The liberal peace can thus serve as a discursive legitimation of the present ‘capitalist 
socio-economic order’, the perpetuation of which needs to be regarded as rationally and morally 
favourable on all levels of society. The maintenance of this image can be taken as far as to 
conceal the pursuit of political and economic self-interest via the means of war and torture, by 
presenting it as moral duty or responsibility to protect. The historian Daniele Ganser calls this 
‘soft power’ or the ‘power of interpretation’. Because this power shapes our view of the world, it 
can make itself disappear.410 According to him, it is time to become sensitive to the mechanisms 
of ‘soft power’ and ask how politics actually work in terms of finding reasons for wars like the 
one that took place in Libya in 2011, or, as mentioned above, the one in Afghanistan. Are we 
always presented with lies?411 And what alternatives remain for us? 
 
 
4.2.2  Deconstructing for a Peace to Come 
 
Appeltshauser does not end her article on a pessimistic note. According to her, to regard violence 
as pervasively negative is to forget a very important part of differential thought. Violence is not 
purely negative; it is also productive.412 Without it – without the determination of things, and thus 
without the risk to disrespect, or even harm – the world would not be comprehensible to us. All 
Being would be unthinkable, and we human beings incapable of both intentionality and action. 
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As Derrida argues, we need to speak. Only then can we have a chance at respecting the Other for 
what he or she is. Derrida thus takes a more pragmatic stance than Lévinas. For him, pure 
nonviolence – ethical peace – is not possible within the historicity of this world. But it can remain 
an aim, a telos, a guiding light. Always to come hospitality, forgiveness, justice, and ultimately 
peace in their purity remain ‘unthinkable, unutterable, impossible’. Nonetheless, it is our 
responsibility to work for them.  
One way, we can do this, is by taking on the responsibility of relentless deconstruction. 
We need to look at texts, at writing, question words and established patches of meaning, so as to 
expose the hierarchies of conceptual oppositions, without trying to institute yet another fixed and 
hardened point of view in regards to “how we should think or act”413. This is not to say that no 
approach will ever regain a hegemonic status. Interpretations of ourselves, the world, and ideals 
concerning the right way to act or construct our social life will continue to manifest. It is the task 
of deconstruction to remain attentive to their emergence and have the tools to bring the hidden 
mechanisms of domination to light.414 Deconstruction, Derrida writes, is justice. But it is a justice 
never reached. Thus, just like Lévinas, Derrida asks us to embark on a journey into the unknown, 
without fixed meanings. We, as philosophers, need to be an open question: relentless, but at the 
same time embracing an attitude of hesitation and humility, led by a deep concern for the safety 
of the singular Other, even though this singularity can never become consciously named without 
doing it harm.415  
Practically, this might mean, first of all, acknowledging that “the political refers to a 
‘space of power, conflict and antagonism’ at the core of social interaction”416. Derrida does not 
engage in a discussion on whether the natural state of men is a state of peace or war. In any case, 
we can never know, because there is always already society. And in it, life simply is antagonism 
and conflict. There are dilemmas, there is discrimination, inclusion and exclusion, etc. An 
everlasting peaceful condition, as it is envisioned by Kant and ultimately also by the liberal 
peace, is a peace of the dead. It would harbour neither space nor time, and thus could not tolerate 
becoming. On the other hand, Polat argues that accepting the conflictual nature of social relations 
equally harbours the potential for politics to become a “radical and genuinely pluralistic 
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democracy”417. Because peace always lies in the future – is always to come – it begs for a process 
of continuous political transformation toward justice as such. Thus, Derrida, like Lévinas, asks 
ethics to weave itself into politics. Deconstruction intervenes. Demanding it, Derrida makes room 
for “ethical struggles in the juridical and political spheres […] through a critique of violence, of 
the violence of law and its role in justice”418. Derrida knows that we cannot overcome this 
violence. Still, he hopes that embarking on a process of radical democratisation might steer us 
toward a “promised land of a post-metaphysical ethics and politics without adumbrating its 
geography”419.420 Again, Lévinas and Derrida do not seem to be so far apart. In fact, as I shall 
elaborate further in the conclusion, their approaches might provide quite a complementary picture 
on violence and peace. 
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5  Conclusion – To Start with ‘Secondly’ 
 
In this thesis I set out to analyse the violent and imperial character of the liberal peace from a 
philosophical perspective. I have argued that the accusations of violence and imperialism, liberal 
peacebuilding is faced with today cannot be solved by merely choosing a different approach to 
policy-making. The imperial traits of liberalism are, among other things, the result of deeper-
lying assumptions concerning human nature, subjectivity, epistemology and ontology. As guiding 
research question, I thus asked, how the imperial character of the liberal peace could best be 
explained with the philosophical approaches of Lévinas and Derrida, and if their approaches 
might provide us with alternatives for peace. First, I presented the liberal peace both in its self-
ascribed glory and in its violent, at times brutal, and in any case imperial and often neo-colonial 
downside. Second, I introduced the philosophical approaches of Lévinas and Derrida in order to 
juxtapose them to the discourse of liberal peace.  
When considering the approaches of Lévinas and Derrida, it first of all becomes very clear 
that our understanding of subjectivity, cognition, ontology, etc. has a great influence on the way, 
we imagine, plan, and implement peace. I my analysis, both Lévinas and Derrida were found to 
regard the rational subject as a consequence of some kind of relatedness. In Lévinas’ view, the 
subject emerges from an irreducible relation to the Other. Derrida, on the other hand, stresses that 
subjectivity is merely an effect of differentiation. It does not own truth. Nor is it absolutely free. 
The necessity of relation, for subjectivity to evolve, has relevance for peace studies, because 
peace can no longer be about protecting the illusion of absolute and autonomous freedom. By 
falsifying the liberal notion of subjectivity, the entire discourse of the liberal peace crumbles.  
That is to say, the liberal peace has to declare our state of nature a state of war, because it is 
based on philosophical approaches that centre around a rational, self-present, but also self-
interested subject. In consequence, the liberal peace needs to create a unified society in which the 
danger of a war of all against all is contained. The social contract is institutionalised in order to 
appease, to tranquillise, and at the same time control a given population. From a Lévinasian 
perspective, the liberal peace remains armed because it still operates within egology, the realm of 
the Same. Most problematically, it is a peace concerned with me, my freedom, and my 
possessions. This concern ultimately institutionalises inequality by legally protecting private 
property. Imperialism, therefore, is not something accidentally part of the liberal condition. It lies 
at its heart. Living in the ‘liberal family’, we do not want to see this. Liberalism is presented to us 
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as the only possible way to shape society in order to reach ever-greater progress. Within the 
liberal discourse, as I have argued with Derrida, structures of inequality, exploitation and 
imperialism are reinterpreted in terms of (moral) necessities and thereby made to disappear. The 
same applies to acts of violence and brutality conducted by liberal states – such as torture or the 
use of drones.  
In sum, Lévinas confirms that imperialism is an inherent aspect of liberal thought and 
practice. Derrida, on the other hand, is equally aware of the link between liberalism and 
mechanisms of domination, but he does not regard imperialism as an exclusively liberal trait. To 
him, it can evolve wherever a particular discourse gains the hegemony of interpretation. Either 
way, both Lévinas and Derrida demand we scrutinise the liberal discourse in its entirety in order 
to disclose what lies behind our feelings of victory and superiority. Their approaches attack the 
liberal peace in its good conscience. They show us that the liberal peace tells our entire story by 
beginning with ‘secondly’. It declares our state of nature a state of war and thus operates with a 
very limited view on what it means to be a human being – namely, rational, autonomous, and 
free. How then, can we, who are no longer fooled by the thought of pure, and self-present 
rationality, imagine peace? 
Lévinas’ and Derrida’s answer would be: We cannot. Peace cannot be thought of. It is not a 
condition that can be determined and then mechanically engineered from the outside. To find 
peace, we need to embark on a journey into the unknown, on every level of society. The only 
thing that can lead us on this road, are an openness to, a deep concern and a responsibility for the 
Other. This might manifest in an attitude of goodness, humility, hesitation, and simultaneously of 
informed and constant criticism. Nevertheless, this attitude does not protect us from the fact that, 
to some extent, we might always fail to protect the singularity of the Other, because there always 
already is society, the third party, and the violence of history.  
Together, the approaches of Lévinas and Derrida concretise this process into the open by 
addressing three spheres of sociality. In the sphere of the face-to-face, which is most discussed by 
Lévinas, we need to embrace the fact that, even though we see the Other’s suffering, we are not 
the ones to know best, what he or she needs. It is the Other for whom we are responsible; but it is 
also the Other who will first demand our help. For peacebuilding, this implies a radical change of 
approach. Perhaps we need to leave all preconceived notions behind, in order to be able to meet 
the Other openly and listen to what he or she has to say. In the discursive sphere, which is the 
focus of Derrida, we are asked to deconstruct endlessly every text, every system of meaning, 
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every written and spoken word in order to detect hierarchies that are hidden by the means of e.g. 
neutralisation, universalization, objectivation, etc. Peace scholars, too, must remain ever-vigilant 
to the power of definition, engage in radical self-criticism, and deconstruct the concepts with 
which they operate – such as the concept of violence. In the sphere of politics, we have to leave 
behind self-interest and, with it, the wish to control and totalise. Instead we should engage in a 
process of radical democratisation that respects the singularity of every human being, and thus 
constantly strives for plurality instead of unity.  
So far, I have argued that philosophy indeed matters for the study and building of peace. In 
order to better understand the inherent violent and imperial tendencies of the liberal peace, peace 
scholars and peacebuilders do well to engage in a critical reconsideration of human nature, the 
possibility of knowledge, and the character of subjectivity and freedom. To end, however, I 
would like to turn the tables and ask what philosophy could learn from all this. If peace studies 
and peacebuilding are a concretisation of philosophical thought, how should philosophy relate to 
the violence its own basic assumptions create? Perhaps, we, as philosophers, need to ask what our 
primary intention should be. What is to lead our search for truth and wisdom? Could we 
conceptualise human nature in a manner that does not corrupt our understanding of the way we 
comprehend and engage in the world, but still allows us to respect otherness and singularity? 
Could we not overcome our fear of the ‘malicious demon’ reflected in our failure to fully grasp 
multiplicity and plurality? Lévinas and Derrida try to do so. Further debates need to follow 
because, as the initial citation of this thesis states, our indifference to the suffering of the singular 
Other has the potential to kill. If it is indeed as Derrida says, and we cannot escape history, then 
let us hope that philosophy will take its part in shaping a future “found in the past’s fugitive 
moments of compassion rather than in its solid centuries of warfare”421. 
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